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I.
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal and cross appeal from a Judgment entered against the Utah
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") in a personal injury case involving a single car
rollover accident on an 1-15 construction project near Cove Fort, Utah.

Daniel

McCorvey, a 35 year-old quadriplegic, sued UDOT and its contractor, LeGrand Johnson
Construction Company ("LeGrand Johnson") for the injuries he sustained in that
accident.1 Following weeks of trial and the testimony of almost 40 witnesses, the jury
returned a Special Verdict in which it found that UDOT and LeGrand Johnson were
negligent, that UDOT and LeGrand Johnson's negligence was a proximate cause of
Daniel McCorvey's injuries, that UDOT's proportion of fault was 28 percent and that
LeGrand Johnson's proportion of fault was 50 percent.
The jury awarded Daniel McCorvey $1,500,000 in general damages and
$3,921,282 in special damages. Of this later figure, $795,609 represented the present
value of Daniel McCorvey's future wage loss, $131,551 represented his past medical
costs, and $2,366,378 represented the present value of what it would it take to meet
McCorvey's future medical and health care needs. Daniel McCorvey's financial losses

^McCorvey's passenger, Paul Page, was also paralyzed in this accident.
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are so high because he has the most extensive level of paralysis. He is paralyzed from
the neck down as a result of two fractured vertebrae sustained in the accident.
UDOT's proportionate share of this verdict was $1,517,800. But pursuant to the
damage limitation cap contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34, the trial court entered
a Judgment against UDOT for $250,000. The $250,000 judgment amount constitutes 4.6
percent of Daniel McCorvey's total damage* and only about 6 percent of Daniel
McCorvey's economic loss.
Daniel McCorvey appealed from the trial court's decision. The single issue raised
in his appeal is whether the $250,000 statutory damage cap imposed on UDOTs
operations is unconstitutional on its face or as applied? Without any empirical evidence
or data to support its contentions, UDOT argues that the $250,000 statutory damage
limitation cap is both necessary and reasonable.2 As an alternative position, UDOT
urges this Court to invalidate the entire Governmental Immunity Act if the statutory
damage limitation cap is found to be unconstitutional. Daniel McCorvey is submitting

2

UDOT also contends McCorvey's claim that the recovery limits statute violated his right
to a jury trial under Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution should not be considered
because it was not raised before the trial court. This contention, however, is fallacious.
McCorvey based his challenge to the statutory damage limitation on Condemarin v. University
Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). The trial court was given a copy of the Condemarin
decision and the applicability of that authority was argued extensively. More importantly,
though, in that decision Justice Durham considered the effect of the statutory cap on the
constitutionalrightto a jury trial and concluded that "the absurdly low amount contained
in ih~ recovery limits statutes infringes egregiously on that right/ 775 P.2d at
366. (Emphasis added). So much for UDOT's argument that the $250,000 statutory damage
cap's violation of McCorvey's right to a jury trial was not before the trial court.
-2-

this Reply Brief in support of his challenge to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 as that statute
is applied to the operations of UDOT.

n.
CITATIONS TO RECORD
"R" refers to the record on appeal. All subsequent references to the record are to
the record in the consolidated case, C-87-4304. Daniel McCorvey has filed two addenda
containing certain exhibits and other key documents. The first addendum was submitted
in conjunction with McCorvey's Opening Brief. Materials contained in that addendum
will be cited by the abbreviation "Add. I" and the section of the addendum where the
document or exhibit can be found.

A second addendum is incorporated in this

Responsive Brief. Materials in the addendum contained in this Responsive Brief will be
cited by the abbreviation "Add. II" and the page of the addendum at which that document
or exhibit can be found.

m.
SUMMARY

ARGUMENT

Through its negligent operations, UDOT has taken from Daniel McCorvey
everything that gives life dignity and meaning. UDOT has made Daniel McCorvey
totally dependent upon others for his care and survival. UDOT has taken from Daniel
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McCorvey his savings, his home, and his right to earn and achieve. In place of these and
other fiindamental rights and liberties, UDOT has given Daniel McCorvey a life of
constant pain and suffering, and a life of poverty. This massive destruction of Daniel
McCorvey's property and liberty interests should trigger the need for heightened scrutiny
by this Court in reviewing the constitutionality of the $250,000 damage limitation cap as
that statute is applied to UDOT's operations.
In an earlier decision, Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989), this Court recognized the need for such added scrutiny in its review of the
statutory damage limitation cap as that law was applied to the University of Utah
Hospital's operations. There is no reason why the same higher level of review should
not be applied in the McCorvey case. Consequently, UDOT should bear the burden of
proving that the recovery limits statute is necessary to its continued operations, that it is
reasonable under the circumstances, and that this law bears a fair and substantial
relationship to the elimination of a clear social or economic evil. But UDOT has not met
this burden of proof.
UDOT offers no risk analysis or other empirical evidence to support its claimed
necessity for such a cap protecting its operations. Nor can UDOT do so given Utah
Transportation Commission Regulations requiring — at no cost to the public treasury —
contractors to obtain liability insurance to protect motorists on UDOT highway
construction and maintenance projects as well as regulations requiring contractors to
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indemnify UDOT for losses due to claims by persons injured on such projects. The
statutory damage limitation cap is also arbitrary and unreasonable in light of these and
other methods to protect the public treasury without singling out the seriously injured to
suffer lives of misery and poverty.
Not only does the statutory cap as applied to the seriously injured work a gross
injustice, but it is also a direct contravention of the strong public policy goals of
compensating tort victims, promoting settlements and fostering greater safety concerns
on behalf of would be tort feasors. In the case of the seriously injured, such as Daniel
McCorvey, the damage limitation cap does not meet the policy of compensation because
the recovery limit is less than 5 percent of Daniel McCorvey's out-of-pocket loss nowhere near the $2,366,378 which it will take just to meet his future health care needs.
The public policy objective of deterrence is also frustrated by the $250,000 recovery
limits statute because such aridiculouslylow cap on compensation provides no incentive
to governmental tort feasors to discontinue or change procedures that are economical but
dangerous to the public.
The public policy favoring settlements is similarly abused by the statutory cap.
Unlike private insurance companies, which are subject to regulations requiring good faith
evaluations in their settlement of claims and common law liability for not doing so,
UDOT's Risk Management Division has no similar obligations of good faith and fair
dealing. Because of the statutory cap, UDOT's Risk Management Division is free to and
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does gamble with the lives of the seriously injured by denying meritorious claims such
as Daniel McCorvey's. Rather than a shield to protect the public treasury, the statutory
damage limitation cap can and is being used by UDGT's Risk Management Division as
a sword against the seriously injured who, like McCorvey, are forced to spend tens of
thousands of dollars just to obtain the ridiculously low compensation limits set by that
statute.
When the theoretical and speculative benefits to UDOT of the statutory cap are
weighed against the very real harm and injustice this law causes both to the seriously
injured and to the public at large, the balance must be struck against applying this liability
cap to UDOT's operations. Insofar as the seriously injured are concerned, the absurdly
low amount contained in the recovery limits statute and the unfair advantage this law
gives to UDOT's "isk Management Division, is an unlawful infringement upon a
governmental tort vutim's right to a jury trial, and right to an effective remedy for his
or her injuries. It is likewise a denial of the governmental tort victim's right to the equal
protection of the laws, and a violation of the his or her right to due process, both
substantive and procedural. In this particular case, Daniel McCorvey's constitutional
rights were further violated because the statutory damage limitation cap was used to
shield the contractor from additional liability and to take from Daniel McCorvey the
insurance coverage he was entitled to by law.

-6-

Finally, the doctrine of severability does not require this Court to find the entire
Governmental Immunity Act unconstitutional merely because the recovery limits statute
as applied to UDOT is unconstitutional.

The legislative purpose behind the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act was to waive sovereign immunity as to some claims, but not
as to others, and to provide a procedure by which those persons injured by governmental
tort feasors could have their claims presented and resolved. By declaring the Utah
Legislature's attempt to limit the recovery for personal injury claims against UDOT
unconstitutional, this Court will not destroy or invalidate the legislative purpose behind
all 38 provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. This Court was not prepared
to jettison that law when it decided Condemarin and neither should it be prepared to do
so now.

However, if the Court is inclined to strike down the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act and reinstate total common law sovereign immunity, then Daniel
McCorvey asks that prior to doing so the parties be allowed to brief and argue the
constitutionality of common law sovereign immunity and that this Court decide that issue.

-7-

IV.
ARGUMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE $250.000 STATUTORY DAMAGE
LIMITATION CAP ON UDOT'S
OPERATIONS >l OULD BE DETERMINED
UK .^ TfflS COURT'S
HOLDING IN CONDEMARIN
V. UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
In Condemarin v. Univenity Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), a majority of
this Court held that the Govern

atal Immunity Act's limits on tort recoveries against

'vernmental entities was unconstitutional as applied to the University of Utah Hospital.
775 P.2d at 366 (per Durham, J.). This Court restricted its holding in Condemarin to
the constitutionality of the statutory damage limitation cap as applied to the University of
Utah Medical Center, but Condemarin nevertheless addressed the constitutionality of the
very statute challenged by McCorvey in this appeal. Condemarin, therefore, while not
controlling because its holding was expressly limited to the University of Utah Medical
Center, should be the starting point for this Court's review of the constitutionality of the
$250,000 statutory damage limitation cap as applied to UDOT's operations. But, in its
Responsive Brief, UDOT argues otherwise.
UDOT urges the Court to ignore Condemarin and to decide McCorvey's challenge
to Utah Code § 63-30-34 on the same arguments previously considered and rejected by
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the Condemarin decision.3

UDOT attempts to distinguish Condemarin from the

McCorvey case on the basis of the governmental versus non-governmental functions
analysis that was historically employed by courts to determine whether particular acts by
governmental employees were subject to common law sovereign immunity.

UDOT

argues that the rationale in Condemarin should not apply to the McCorvey case because
the maintenance or construction of highways is a traditional governmental function,
whereas hospital services were traditionally proprietary functions. But this "governmental/proprietary " test was specifically rejected by the Court in Standiford v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
In place of this governmental/proprietary test, Standiford articulated a new Mcore
of governmental activity" standard for determining governmental immunity, but only in
those situations in which immunity has not been waived. In the instant case, the existence
of governmental immunity for UDOT's maintenance or construction of defective
highways, bridges and other structures is not an issue. The Utah Legislature has waived
such immunity.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8. Thus, UDOT's efforts to distinguish

Condemarin on the basis of the governmental function (traditional common law sovereign

^UDOT, for example, refers the Court to cases from other jurisdictions that have
affirmed damage limitation caps. (UDOT Responsive Brief, pp. 64-65). But this authority
preceded Condemarin. Moreover, Condemarin specifically considered and rejected this case
law. S ^ Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 381, fn. 40. The fact that other jurisdictions have damage
limitation caps higher or lower than Utah's was not persuasive to this Court in Condemarin.
Neither should UDOT's rehash of this same authority and arguments be persuasive in the
McCorvey case.
-9-

immunity) versus non-governmental function (no traditional common law sovereign
immunity) are irrelevant.

See alsfl Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(l)(b) (applying the

recovery limits statute "regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the injury
is characterized as governmentalM).
Likewise irrelevant is UDOT's extensive discussion in its Responsive Brief about
the "history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity." (UDOT Responsive Brief, pp. 3542). The single issue on Daniel McCorvey's appeal is not whether sovereign immunity
for UDOT's operations exists, but whether once immunity for such activities has been
waived, is the $250,000 statutory damage limitation cap constitutional? The defendants
in Condemarin took a similar approach that was specifically rejected by Justice Durham.
The Condemarin defendants' position was:
[T]hat because sovereign immunity was a well settled principle at the
time the Utah Constitution was adopted, the challenged provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act do not deprive plaintiffs of
any remedies or property rights.
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 351. Justice Durham noted that the existence of immunity for
the University of Utah Hospital and the validity of the damage limitation statute were
separate and distinct issues, and that this argument impermissibly "collapses the
classification [sovereign immunity] issue into the recovery limits question." LdL at 352.
This argument carried no weight with the Court in Condemarin. Neither should that
argument somehow be more meritorious with respect to Daniel McCorvey's challenge to
the statutory cap.
- 10-

For purposes of applying this Court's reasoning in Condemarin to Daniel
McCorvey's challenges to the statutory cap statute on UDOT's operations, it is important
to emphasize that the issue in both cases is identical. In Justice Durham's own words,
the relevant issue addressed in Condemarin was:
Therightto recover foil, rather than limited, compensationfroma
[particular] governmental tort feasor.
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 352. (Emphasis added). That same issue is before this Court
in McCorvey. Only in the McCorvey case, the particular governmental tort feasor is
UDOT and not the University of Utah Hospital.
Admittedly, Condemarin involved a $100,000 cap on liability under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-34, which was subsequently amended to increase the recovery limits to the
current $250,000. But this amendment to the recovery limit statute does not materially
distinguish Condemarin from McCorvey. When the seriously injured are concerned, the
additional $150,000 of compensation triggered by the post-Condemarin amendment to
section 63-30-34 is meaningless because this increase in the statutory cap has no material
effect on the compensation of the seriously injured. Whether the recover limit is set at
$250,000 or $100,000 the results are the same: Neither amount is likely to cover even
the medical expenses of the seriously injured. Thus, the analysis which this Court
undertook of section 63-30-34 in Condemarin is certainly relevant and applicable to
Daniel McCorvey's constitutional challenge to the same law and that analysis should not,
as UDOT urges, be abandoned by this Court.
-11 -

V.
ARGUMENT: WHETHER THE $250.000
STATUTORY DAMAGE LDyflTATION CAP
ON UDOT'S OPERATIONS IS EITHER
REASONABLE OR NECESSARY IS
NOT RELEVANT
THE ISSUE
OF THIS S
UTE'S
CONSTITUTIONS i y BECAUSE
SOMETHING /iKIN TO A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IS INVOLVED A N D UDOT HAS NOT MET
ITS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT
UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-34
IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Condemarin certainly was no* - unanimous opinion. Nevertheless, the three
Justices in the majority in that case die

ree that the right to a remedy for damages done

to one's person was an important substantiverightprotected by Article I, section 11 of
the Utah Constitution. See. 775 P.2d at 357-58, 360 (Durham, J.), 366-68 (Zimmerman,
J.) and 372, 373 (Stewart, J.). These Justices also agreed that the statutory cap on
damages interfere with that right. See, Li. at 358, 363 (Durham, J.), 368 (Zimmerman,
J.) and 372 (Stewart, J.). They likewise agreed that because the statute impinged on a
constitutional right, the presumption that this law is constitutional disappearec nd
heightened scrutiny was required. See, Li. at 3M-56 (Durham, J.), 368 (Zimmerman,
J.) and 372, 373 (Stewart, J.). UDOT, however, argues that this heightened scrutiny is
- 12-

not warranted in Daniel McCorvey's case because the construction and maintenance of
public roadways is a governmental function for which UDOT would have been immune
from suit under the common law. (UDOT Responsive Brief, p. 45).4
UDOT claims that the heightened scrutiny analysis set forth in Condemarin only
applies to those instances in which the governmental tort feasors are engaged in a
proprietary rather than governmental function. (I.d.). But UDOT has clearly misread
the majority opinions in Condemarin. While Condemarin did address the proprietary
versus governmental function test, this was done solely in the context of deciding whether
section 60-30-3 could extend governmental immunity to the University of Utah Hospital.
The proprietary versus governmental function test was not the basis for
Condemarin's holding that the statutory damage limitation cap was unconstitutional. A
fair reading Condemarin shows that this traditional test for common law sovereign
immunity was only being applied to determine whether the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act could expand traditional common law sovereign immunity concepts to nongovernmental functions. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 352.
Condemarin was thus not a situation in which there had been a specific waiver of
governmental immunity such as in the McCorvey case.

Consequently, a significant

portion of Condemarin was devoted to addressing what if any common law governmental

4

This statement is not exactly true. Historically, pre-statehood, the public policy was
to hold governmental entities liable for injuries to persons caused by defective streets and
highways, gee Yearance v. City of Salt Lake, 6 Utah 398 (1890).
- 13-

immunity was enjoyed by the University of Utah Hospital; whereas the existence of
sovereign immunity is not an issue in McCorvey with respect to UDOT's maintenance and
construction of highways. More importantly, however, Justice Durham clearly states in
her opinion that the ability of the Utah Legislature to extend the governmental function
immunity contained in section 63-30-3 to the University of Utah Hospital was separate
and distinct appellate issue from the question of the plaintiffs "light to recover full,

rather than limited, compensation from a governmental tort feasor/ See,
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 351-52. (Emphasis added).
The Condemarin holding stands for the proposition that the right to a remedy for
damages done to one's person is an important substantive right protected by Article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution, and because it is an important substantive right,
statutes like the $250,000 damage limitation cap which impinge upon such a protected
right require heightened scrutiny.

See 775 P.2d at 354-56 (Durham, J.), 368

(Zimmerman, J.), and 372-373 (Stewart, J.). Moreover, the substantive right approach
taken in Condemarin is consistent with this Court's thinking in an analogous body of law
concerning the protected MpropertyM interests one has under the due process clause of the
Utah Constitution.
Under the due process clause of the Utah Constitution, which is found in Article
I, section 7, the right to work, the right to engage in gainful occupations and the right to
receive compensation for work are constitutionally protected property rights. This Court
- 14-

has defined "property" in a due process context to encompass all valuable interests which
a person may possess outside of himself or herself, especially the right to achieve.
The term 'property' in this clause, embraces all valuable interests
which a man may possess outside of himself) that is to say,
outside of his life and liberty. It is not confined to mere tangible
property but extends to every species of vested right.

Thus one may be said to have a special property in his profession or
calling by means of which he makes his support, and he can be
deprived of it only by due process of law. . . . The right to

work, the right to engage in gainful occupations, the
right to receive compensation for one's work are
essentially property rights. So too is the right to enjoy
the benefits resulting from the work of one so employed.
So also the right to engage in commerce or in legitimate business is
property. But no man can have a vested interest in the work or

labor of another. . . . One's body and life are his own and
he cannot be required to yield up either except at his own
desire, the call of his country, or the decree of his God.
McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1938). (Emphasis added).
Daniel McCorvey enjoyed these same property rights too, they are substantive rights, and
they have been taken from him by UDOT.
UDOT has taken from Daniel McCorvey everything that gave his life dignity and
meaning. It has taken from him his savings, his home, and his right to earn and achieve.
UDOT has also taken from Daniel McCorvey the ability to have children, the ability to
experience physical love, the ability to travel and the ability to freely associate with other
persons. In place of these rights and liberties, UDOT has given Daniel McCorvey a life
- 15-

of constant pain and suffering, a life of loneliness, a life in which he is totally dependent
upon others for his care and survival, a life of despair and a life of poverty. Surely such
massive destruction of Daniel McCorvey's property and liberty interests should trigger
the need for heightened scrutiny by an appellate court in reviewing the constitutionality
of a law that purports to allow a governmental tort feasor to visit this enormity of wrong
upon an individual with impunity.
Just as surely, those like UDOT who would claim need for such a law should be
required to present evidence that the alleged need actually exists, and that the benefits to
be derived from this statutory protection far outweigh the harm imposed on both
individual rights and the public. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358, 368. But that
certainly never occurred in the present case. Without any empirical evidence to support
its contentions, UDOT argues that the $250,000.00 statutory damage limitation cap is
necessary for its continued operations.5 The defendants in Condemarin likewise tried to

5

In>tead of evidence, UDOT submits as an Addendum to its Responsive Brief, a Report
and Recommendation of the Utah Legislative Council on the effects of a waiver of governmental
immunity. Approximately four pages in length, the Report recommends that the "immunity of
governmental entities should be waived in relation to responsibility for the negligent acts or
omissions of public employees." Id, at 46. While the Report does state that the question of
payment of claims was a matter of concern to the Legislative Council, there is no indication
what those concerns were. There is only the Legislative Council's vague and unsupported
statement of concern. This Court rejected a similar attempt to justify the recovery limits cap
for the University of Utah Hospital's activities with such broad and speculative proof. See
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 358, 368-69.
- 16-

convince this Court of the necessity for the damage limitation cap without any supporting
evidence.
Returning to the present case, there can be no question that

the legislation at issue, which severely restricts the right
of every citizen to recover even actual out-of-pocket
losses, both from a narrow category of health care
providers who are the actual malpractioners and for the
governmental employer, substantially infringes upon
those interests specifically protected by Article I, section
11 . . . . For that reason, the burden of demonstrating
the constitutionality of the statute shifts to the proponents. The supporters of the legislation have not carried their
burden. The justifications advanced for the legislators having
abridged the important right of citizens to recover even out-of-pocket
losses occasioned by injuries to their person in a narrow category of
circumstances for the benefit of a narrow category of defendants are

extraordinarily weak. In fact, at oral argument both the
attorney general and the lawyer for the hospital and
physicians involved admitted that they have no empirical
evidence that damage awards in Utah have threatened the
stability of any unit of government and that the concerns
that led to the legislation were based on anecdotal
evidence.
Condemarin, 775 P.2d 368-69. (Emphasis added). If defendants' anecdotal concerns
were not sufficient to meet the burden of proof required of them in Condemarin, a
restating of those same concerns in McCorvey gains UDOT nothing.
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VI.
ARGUMENT: A $250.000 DAMAGE
LIMITATION CAP ON UDOT'S
OPERATIONS IS BOTH UNNECESSARY
A N D UNREASONABLE IN VIEW OF
THF AVATT.ARTTJTY OF
INSURANCE TO UDOT AT
NO COST TO THE
P U T T T O TREASURY
UDOT argues that the $250,000 statutory damage limitation cap is necessary for
its continued operations. There is, of course, no empirical evidence to support such a
claim. But even if there were, the argument is not well taken for UDOT has failed to
advise the Court that regulations exist whereby UDOT can be protected from claims such
as Daniel McCorvey's through insurance purchased at no cost to the public treasury.
On June 22, 1979, the Utah Transportation Commission adopted the Standard
Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction. (R. 1923-24, Add. II, pp. 1 and 5-6).
These regulations govern contracts between UDOT and private contractors for the
maintenance or construction of roads and bridges, including the 1-15 and 1-70 chip seal
project. These regulations were part of LeGrand Johnson's contract for this chip seal
project. (R. 3004, pp. 157-58).
To protect members of the public, these Utah Transportation Commission
regulations required contractors to provide insurance. Contained in Regulation 107.14,
this insurance provision reads as follows:
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Before the contract is awarded, the Contractor with the successful

bid shall be required to furnish to the Department [of Transportation] a copy of the public liability and property
damage insurance policy which is to be in force and applicable
to the project. In addition, the Contractor shall be required to
furnish an affidavit that the Contractor agrees to keep the policy in
force for the duration of the contract.
(Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Reg. 107.14; Add. I, § 5).
(Emphasis added).
It would be a simple matter for the Utah Transportation Commission to amend
Regulation 107.14 to require that UDOT be named as a co-insured on the contractor's
liability policy.

Such a regulation will protect the public and UDOT without any

burdensome expense to the State of Utah. It is, therefore, disingenuous for UDOT to
argue that the $250,000 damage limitation cap is so necessary to its continued operations
that the seriously injured, like Daniel McCorvey, must suffer lives of constant pain and
abject poverty. Neither was it reasonable for the Utah Legislature to subject such a
minuscule and vulnerable group as the seriously injured to this fate with passage of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-34 when there is available so easy and fair a solution as insurance.
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vn.
ARGUMENT: THE $250.000 STATUTORY
DAMAGE LIMITATION CAP SHOULD
NOT BE APPLTFD IN THIS
INSTANCE BECAUSE UDOT
INTENTION ALLY DEPRIVED
DANIEL McCORVEY OF THE
INSURANCE COVERAGE THAT
WOULD HAVE FULLY COMPENSATED HIM FOR HIS DAMAGES
In compliance with the insurance requirement contained in Regulation 107.14 of
the Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, LeGrand Johnson obtained
two policies of insurance for this project, a primary and an umbrella, with total coverage
of $6,000,000. (R. 2634, 2635).6 These policies would have compensated Daniel
McCorvey for his losses but for UDOT's actions. Both before and after McCorvey's
accident, UDOT intentionally acted to deprive Daniel McCorvey of this insurance
coverage. Having thus taken from Daniel McCorvey the insurance coverage with which
he could have been compensated for his injuries, UDOT cannot at this time assert the
$250,000 damage limitation cap as a bar to McCorvey's recovery.
UDOT's pre-accident efforts to destroy McCorvey's insurance coverage involved
the submission of a traffic control plan for this 1-15 chip seal project which did not
6

The existence of this insurance may bring McCorvey within the exception tc ;he
recovery limits statute for those situations when insurance is provided "in excess of the statutory
limits." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-28.
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comply with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways
("MUTCD"). The MUTCD is a federal manual governing traffic control on interstate
highways. By statute, the Utah Transportation Commission was required to adopt and
implement a manual governing placement of traffic control devices on Utah highways.
This statute specifically directs the Utah Transportation Commission to adopt a manual
for the uniform system of traffic control devices which conforms to the MUTCD:
The Manual shall correlate with and where possible conform to
the system set forth in the most recent revised edition of the
'Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets
and Highways' and other standards issued or endorsed by the
Federal Highway Administrator.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-20. (Emphasis added).
In response to this legislative directive, the Utah Transportation Commission
adopted the MUTCD. (Add. II, pp. 1-3). The Utah Transportation Commission likewise
contemporaneously adopted the Standard Specificationsfor Road and Bridge Construction
containing a regulation providing that "all signs, barricades and channeling
devices shall be constructed and erected in accordance with the plans and
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways
. . . ." (Plfs Exhibit 9, Reg. 625). (Emphasis added).7
7

The Utah Transportation Commission adopted the MUTCD on May 25, 1979. (Add.
n, pp. 1-4). Approximately one month later, on June 22, 1979, the Utah Transportation
Commission passed the following resolution adopting the State of Utah Standard Specifications
for Road and Bridge Construction:
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Given this legislative and administrative history, it is not surprising that the
contract for this chip seal project required LeGrand Johnson to design and implement a

traffic control plan which "shall comply with the MUTCD requirements.1'
(Plf s Exhibit 8. ection 405.09; Add. I, § 6).

(Emphasis added).

But instead of

LeGrand Johnson f>ieparing and submitting a traffic control plan that complied with the
MUTCD, UDOT gave the contractor a traffic control plan that did not comply with the
MUTCD, and required LeGrand Johnson to use the defective UDOT plan. (R. 2998, p.
117). LeGrand Johnson could not change the plan without UDOT's written approval.
(R. 3008, p. 18).8

BE IT RESOLVT
Committee, the
Construction, ec
subject to the pre

jrsuant to the authority granted to the Utah Transportation
of Utah Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge
of 1979, is hereby adopted replacing the edition of 1970
jns of the "Utah Administrative Rule Making Act."

(R. 1924, Add. II, pp. 5-6).
8

UDOT's failure to require a traffic control plan that complied with the MUTCD was
perhaps negligence per sj. Idaho, for example, had a similar statute to Utah's requiring the
adoption of a manual for traffic control. Compare I.C. § 49-584 (1982) (requiring the Idaho
Transportation Board to adopt a uniform manual of traffic control) with Utah Code Ann. § 41-620 (contdning similar directives to the Utah Transportation Commission). Like Utah, Idaho
adopted the MUTCD. Having thus been adopted pursuant to statutory authority, Idaho courts
have held that the MlT-rCD has the force and effect of law and that "failure of a local
authority to comply with any of these provisions is negligence" unless otherwise
excused. £§£ Curtis v. Canyon Highway District No. 4, 831 P.2d 541, 552 (Idaho 1992).
(Emphasis added). See also Roberts v. Reed, 827 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Ida. App. 1991) (having
adopted the MUTCD, the Idaho Transportation Department was "bound to abide by it").
(Emphasis added).
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UDOT's own expert witnesses conceded that this traffic control plan did not
comply with the MUTCD. (R. 3006, p. 230). More importantly, McCorvey's traffic
engineering expert, Edward Ruzak, testified that this inadequate UDOT traffic control
plan was a proximate cause of the accident. (R. 2999, pp. 43-44). Thus, had UDOT not
interfered with the contract, LeGrand Johnson alone would have been responsible for
providing the traffic control plan used on this project. Had LeGrand Johnson been
required to comply with both Utah law and the chip seal contact by submitting a traffic
control plan which met the MUTCD standards, then the McCorvey accident would never
have happened. Conversely, had LeGrand Johnson actually submitted the defective traffic
control plan used on this chip seal project, there would have been available to Daniel
McCorvey adequate insurance to cover his damages.
But by its intentional meddling with the contract and violation of law, UDOT
managed to deprive McCorvey of this insurance coverage. In doing so, UDOT overrode
the public policy inherent in Regulation 107.14 requiring contractors to protect the public,
including Daniel McCorvey, with the purchase of liability insurance coverage for State
highway construction projects. Having done so, UDOT should not now be allowed to
assert the $250,000 statutory cap as a defense against Daniel McCorvey's claims.
Yet this was not the only example of UDOT intentionally acting to deprive Daniel
McCorvey of the legislated insurance coverage to which he was entitled. Better examples
can be found during the trial of this case when UDOT stepped forward and intentionally
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shouldered responsibility for McCorvey's accident, thereby shifting 28% of the fault for
that accident from LeGrand Johnson's insurance carrier on to UDOT. An excellent
illustration of UDOT's efforts to shoulder liability for the McCorvey accident so as to
protect the contractor can be seen in the trial testimony of Curtis Berry, UDOT's safety
inspector on this project.
Berry was UDOT's Meyes and ears" on the job. (R. 3005, p. 89). McCorvey's
examination of Berry and other UDOT employees at trial was designed to focus the
responsibility for this accident upon the contractor, LeGrand Johnson. In his direct
examination of Curtis Berry, for example, McCorvey obtained testimony from this
witness to the effect that Berry had little control over the contractor.

On direct

examination, Berry said that while he could make suggestions about how the chip seal
project was managed, the contractor had full control over the project, including
implementing the traffic control plan and keeping motorists' speeds reduced to 25 ; es
per hour.
Q.

But you had some responsibility about the quality of work being
done?

A,

We could just suggest to the contractor what we wanted to do, but
it was really up to him what he did.

Q.

So he could take your suggestions or not?

A.

Yes.

(R. 3005, p. 103).
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* * *

Q.

The sign [traffic control] plan required 25 miles an hour,
didn't it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the contractor's responsibility was to implement the
sign [traffic control] plan, wasn't it?

A.

Yes.

(R. 3005, p. 112). (Emphasis added). The effect of the foregoing testimony by Berry
on direct examination was to focus liability for McCorvey's accident squarely upon
LeGrand Johnson. But this was soon to change.
Following a break in the court proceedings, Berry retook the witness stand and
recanted his earlier testimony. More importantly, Berry's change in testimony was
brought out by UDOT's counsel through the use of leading questions such as the
following:
Q.

Alright. As I recall your testimony, you indicated that you could
give the contractor suggestions.

A.

Yes.

Q.

But the contractor did or did not have to follow; is that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And when you gave that testimony, Curtis, did you mean - was
your meaning to say that all you could do is give suggestions?
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A.

No.

[Mr. Trentadue]. Objection. Leading.
[The Court]. Sustained. The answer will be stricken.
* * *

Q.

"'ould you do more than give suggestions?

A.

Yes.
* * *

Q.

Did you have the power to shut down operations?

A.

Yes.

(LL 158-59).
Under exairNation by UDOT's counsel, Berry eventually reversed all of his
previous testimony that was harmful to the contractor. Berry went on to say in response
to leading questions from UDOT's counsel that UDOT had responsibility for traffic
control on this project, and that UDOT was also responsible for motorists' safety.

Q.

Would it be fair to say your responsibility was that of
seeing that it [the traffic control plan] was accomplished
and carried through?

A.

Yes.9

9

On appeal, UDOT understandably wishes to distance itself from Berry's assumption of
responsibility for implementing the traffic control plan. UDOT now contends on appeal that
"traffic control on this project was ultimately the contractor's responsibility." (UDOT
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Q.

Whose responsibility is it to design and prepare the
traffic control plans?

A.

I don't know where the traffic control plan come out of.

Q.

Would it be the Department [of Transportation]?

A.

Yes. Yes.

(Id. at 161). (Emphasis added).
Feigning outrage, UDOT says that McCorvey's assertions about it deliberately
accepting responsibility for this accident are Mpure fantasy, bordering on deliberate
misrepresentation." (UDOT Responsive Brief, p. 7). But in making such a statement,
UDOT ignores the efforts to which it went at trial to protect the contractor, often at
UDOT's own expense.
On August 3, 1986, several days prior to Daniel McCorvey's accident, UDOT
project engineer Richard Griffin wrote a memorandum to safety inspector Curtis Berry.
In this memorandum, Griffin was very critical of the manner in which LeGrand Johnson
was conducting the chip seal project, especially in matters of motorist safety. Griffin told
Berry in this memorandum to have the contractor chip seal one lane at a time and to keep
the traffic off the chipped lane until it was completed. (Plf s Exhibit 11, Add. I, § 7).

Responsive Brief, p. 13, fn. 8). While Curtis Berry did testify on direct examination that traffic
control was the contractor's responsibility, he clearly changed that testimony in response to
leading questions from UDOT's counsel. It is now a little late in the game for UDOT to
suddenly want to distance itself from the trial testimony of its witnesses and to present the Court
with the "truth" about its role in the 1-15 chip seal project.
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Curtis Berry testified that he received Griffin's memorandum. Berry likewise said that
he told the contractor to keep the lane being chip sealed closed until it was broomed free
of rock, and that only then was the contractor to open the lane to traffic.
Q.

But you did talk with Griffin about closing one of the lanes while
you were chipping it?

A.

Yes. I guess we did.

Q.

And keeping the traffic off while you were chipping it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did you talk with Mr, Peterson about closing the lane and
keeping traffic off until• •*'' as —.

A.

We suggested those imngs, I think.

(R. 3005, p. 108).
LeGrand Johnson's superintendent acknowledged that he was told to chip seal one
lane at a time and to keep traffic off the unswept lane until evening, then he was to sweep
the lane free of rock and "break it loose," which according to superintendent Peterson
meant to "turn the traffic loose" on the newly swept lane. (R. 2998, p. 94).
(Emphasis added). Peterson, however, did not close the unswept lane of 1-15 at the scene
of McCorvey's accident and his failure to do so was a major cause of that accident.10
10

David Merchant, the LeGrand Johnson employee responsible for placing traffic control
signs on the chip seal project testified that just prior to Daniel McCorvey's accident, none of the
lanes of traffic on 1-15 were closed to motorists. (R. 3006, p. 75). Merchant said that before
McCorvey's accident he had taken the Right Lane Closed Ahead signs and "leaned them over
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This evidence would have allowed the jury to assign even more fault to LeGrand Johnson
for Daniel McCorvey's injuries. But LeGrand Johnson was able to shift this additional
fault onto UDOT by yet another one of UDOT's self-sacrificing efforts to protect the
contractor.

This time, it was Richard Griffin who stepped forward to protect the

contractor at great cost to UDOT.
Notwithstanding his August 3, 1986, memorandum about the contractor being
required to chip seal one lane at a time, and notwithstanding the testimony of Curtis
Berry and Steven Peterson to the contrary, Griffin said under oath that he did not want
the unswept lane closed to traffic: "It [the unswept outside lane] was open and
available for their use, yes." (R. 3004, p. 201). (Emphasis added). Griffin even
said that he wanted motorists to travel on the unswept lane at 55 miles per hour. I$L at
198. Griffin's testimony not only helped the contractor to avoid a greater share of
responsibility for Daniel McCorvey's injuries, but it also severely impeached other
evidence favorable to UDOT.
This and other similar testimony brought out by UDOT during the trial was
obviously intended to and did in fact shift liability from LeGrand Johnson on to

on the side of the road so they couldn't be seen [by motorists]." Ii. at 75.
(Emphasis added). Richard Leuttich, UDOT's traffic engineering expert witness, testified that
the presence of the Wright's Suburban in the unswept lane adjacent to McCorvey's Honda Civic
was a "major" cause of the accident. (R. 3006, p. 237).
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UDOT.11 Having thus intentionally skewed the jury results, it would be violative of
McCorvey's rights of substantive and procedural due process under Article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution to apply the $250,000 statutory cap in this instance. It would
similarly violate McCorvey's right to a jury trial, right to an effective remedy for the
wrongs done to him and his right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed under
Utah Constitution, Article L sections 10, 11 and 24.

llr

Throughout the trial, UDOT's employees repeatedly told the jury through leading
questions from UDOT's counsel that the contractor had done nothing wrong. UDOT went so
far in closing argument as to say that McCorvey was making the contractor the " scapegoat"
for his injuries. (R. 3008, p. 66). It should have come as no surprise to UDOT, therefore, that
the jury would find it to be 28% responsible for McCorvey's injuries. What is surprising,
though, is that the evidence upon which the jury'sfindingof fault was based came from UDOT
and not from McCorvey. McCorvey's intention throughout the trial was to place as much
liability as possible upon the contractor. Based upon the chip seal contract and the August 3,
1986 memorandum, McCorvey assumed that LeGrand Johnson had responsibility for traffic
control. McCorvey could not have anticipated the great length to which UDOT would go to
negate its best evidence. Consequently, McCorvey never made UDOT the focus of his liability
case, which explains the proportionate lack of evidence in the record produced by McCorvey
against UDOT as compared to the evidence presented by McCorvey against LeGrand Johnson.
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vm.
ARGUMENT: A $250.000 STATUTORY
DAMAGE LIMITATION CAP ON
UDOT'S OPERATIONS IS
BOTH UNNECESSARY AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT UNDERMINES THE PUBLIC POLICY
OF DETERRENCE FOUND IN
UTAH TORT LAW
It is a "fundamental principle of American law that victims of wrongful or
negligent acts should be compensated to the extent that they have been harmed."
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 354. While the primary purpose of tort law is to compensate
an injured person for damages suffered at the expense of a wrongdoer, courts have long
recognized the public policy of using tort liability actions to deter irresponsible conduct.
See, id at 364 ("the right amount of deterrence is produced by compelling negligent
injurers to make good the victim's losses"). This public policy of deterrence is especially
strong in the area of personal injury law. When the decisions of courts become known
and people realize that they may be held liable for their conduct, there is, of course, a
strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm. But this public policy of
deterrence is undermined by applying the recovery limits statute to UDOT's operations.
Justice Durham questioned in Condemarin whether the intended deterrent effect
of tort law might be somewhat problematic with respect to governmental entities.
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 364. Justice Durham's comments were referenced to the
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thinking of one legal scholar who suspected deterrent incentives were less effective with
respect to governmental bodies operating in a political marketplace than to private tort
feasors who operate in more of an economic marketplace. Id at 364-65. But there was
no empirical evidence presented by that legal commentator to support such a distinction.
Nor should the existence of sue! a, distinction be presumed by this Court.
Deterrence is a long-recognized and valid public policy component of tort law and
it should not be presumed that in the absence of common law sovereign immunity
governmental tort feasors are not influenced by this policy. To the contrary, as a valid
and proven object" re of tort law, the public policy of deterrence should be presumed to
apply to and influence non-immune governmental tort feasors.

But with respect to

UDOT's operations, this hoped for prophylactic effect of tort law is frustrated by the
presence of the $250,000 damage limitation cap.
Like the Ford Motor Cc iv;my, UDOT's policies are driven primarily by economic
considerations.

But unlike Foia Motor Company, which must temper its economic

decisions by weighing the tort exposure it risks by building a cheaper but defective
automobile, UDOT has no similar incentive to promote safety over economic considerations.

Now, Daniel McCorvey realizes this is a strong statement, but it is not

unfounded. To see how this damage limitation cap on UDOT's negligence frustrates the
public policy inherent in tort law of encouraging safety improvements, this Court need
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only look at the fatal accident that occurred on the 1-70 portion of this chip seal project
several days after McCorvey's accident.
Daniel McCorvey's accident occurred on Thursday, August 7, 1986. Daniel
Webster was a UDOT District Safety Coordinator. His duty was to investigate serious
accidents. Webster met with UDOT's safety inspector Curtis Berry and investigated
McCorvey's accident on the late afternoon and early evening of August 7, 1986. (R.
3004, pp. 48-49). On the evening of August 7, 1986, therefore, it certainly should have
been obvious to Webster, Curtis Berry and the other UDOT employees that traffic control
on this chip seal project was seriously defective. If such was not immediately obvious
following Daniel McCorvey's accident, then it should have been obvious the next
morning when LeGrand Johnson's project superintendent complained to UDOT's project
safety inspector Curtis Berry about the lack of speed control.
Altogether, 34 miles of freeway were being chip sealed on 1-15 and 1-70 as part
of this one project. (R. 3004, p. 192). The traffic control plan which UDOT provided
to LeGrand Johnson required regulatory 25 mile per signs to be placed on the project.
(Plf s Exhibit 10). These speed signs were to be furnished by UDOT. (R. 2998, p. 29).
The chip seal contract specifically stated that UDOT "will furnish to the contractor
advisory speed signs." (Plf s Exhibit 8, § 405.09; Add. I, § 6). (Emphasis added).
But rather than supplying LeGrand Johnson with sufficient regulatory black and white
speed control signs for use throughout the chip seal project as required by the traffic
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control plan, UDOT gave the contractor a single orange and black advisory sign.12 In

12

This sole sign was attached to an early warner which UDOT contends was located in
the middle of the outside lane of 1-15 several hundred yards north of the accident site. (R. 3004,
pp. 68-69). Early warners ^re the tall, flashing arrow board signs. (See plf s Exhibits 3G, 3H,
3W and 58). Early warneis are approximately 10 to 11 feet high and 8 feet wide. (R. 2998,
p. 113). So large, in fact, that they would hardly be missed by motorists. (R. 2998, p. 218).
But none of the motorists who drove that highway on the day of McCorvey's accident
remembered seeing the huge early warner in the middle of the outside lane of 1-15. According
to these witnesses, the early warner could not have been in the middle of the outside lane of 1-15
that day as UDOT contends, because the motorists would have driven over it. Typical of such
testimony was that given by Edward Villarreal who witnessed the accident while driving a semitruck in the outside lane of 1-15. Villarreal testified that there was no early warner in the
outside lane because it would have been struck by motorists. It was also VillarreaTs opinion
that the early warner which Daniel Webster had photographed in the middle of the outside lane
of 1-15 several hours after McCorvey's accident had been moved onto the highway following
the accident:
Q.

Now, on the day of the accident, sir, did you see something flashing in that
[outside] lane?

A.

No, sir. All I saw was that one [construction] sign [miles north of the accident
scene].

Q,

How do you know you didn't see that [early wamer]?

A.

Because, for one thing, the way that van was traveling, the people were passing,
you know, and the way that van was traveling, they would have hit that

thing. They couldn't have missed it. It just wasn't there. It wasn't
there.
(R. 3004, pp. 13-14). (Emphasis added).
# * *

A.

I don't remember seeing those signs, Mr. Berry. And I don't want to make any

statements. But if those pictures were taken very long after that
accident, it could have been that the man would have gone back
there and had those signs put on. Because I don't remember seeing them.
G&. at 45). (Emphasis added).
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terms of message content, arrangement and relative size of lettering, this sign read as
follows:

Loose Gravel
Prevent Broken Windshields
Advisory Speed 25 MPH

(Plf s Exhibit 58).
Obviously concerned about the lack of speed control, LeGrand Johnson's
superintendent, Steven Chase Peterson, went to project safety inspector Curtis Berry on
August 8, 1986, the day following McCorvey's accident, to complain about "having
signs spread out SO thin."13 (R. 2998, p. 99). (Emphasis added). Peterson's diary
indicates that Berry told him that he [Berry] would "see if he could get more loose
gravel [signs]." (Plf s Exhibit 34, Add. I, § 8). (Emphasis added). Clearly then,
UDOT was on notice as early as the morning of August 8, 1986, that the traffic control
on this project was defective and that more speed control was necessary. Nevertheless,
UDOT continued to allow the same hazardous conditions to exist on this chip seal
project, conditions that ultimately claimed the life of a 24 year-old woman on Monday
morning, August 11, 1986.

1

This was the same morning on which an attorney employed by LeGrand Johnson's
insurance company came to the accident scene and met with LeGrand Johnson's superintendent,
Steven Chase Peterson. (R. 2998, p. 79).
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Susanne Quinn Orcholski was killed on the 1-70 portion of this chip seal project
when her small car went out of control in an unswept lane. A four-mile section of 1-70
had been chip sealed on Friday, August 8, 1986, the day after Daniel McCorvey's
accident. But despite already having had a serious accident involving paralyzing injuries
to two young men, and despite having been told by LeGrand Johnson's superintendent
that there were not enough signs, UDOT permitted the contractor to leave the 1-70
roadway with the outside lane unswept over the weekend without warning signs or traffic
control. The contractor, in short, was allowed to create the very same conditions on 1-70
that had already placed Paul Page and Daniel McCorvey in wheelchairs for the remainder
of their lives.
Like McCorvey's accident, Susanne Orcholski's fatal accident on 1-70 was caused
by a lack of speed control on the freshly graveled, unswept highway. David Merchant,
a LeGrand Johnson employee, testified that Ms. Orcholski was killed when her car went
out of control as she came "off the old road on to the c h i p s /
Q.

You if> :- ated that there were other accidents that occurred along that
stretch of road or on 1-70? Would you tell me about those.

A.

This was, I think, a Honda Civic car headed east on 1-70 that had
done approximately the same thing, off the old road, on to the chips,
and was going too fast and couldn't correct themselves, so they just
went off and hit the side of the mountain.

Q.

Off the old road, on to the chips, is what you said,
wasn't it sir?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And by that you meant the old chip surface on to the
newly chipped surface, didn't you, sir?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's just what happened to Mr. McCorvey in this case, isn't
it? Off the old chipped surface done a day or two before and on to
the newly chipped road.

A.

I don't recall.

(R. 3006, pp. 75-76). (Emphasis added).
UDOT's district safety coordinator, Daniel Webster, also investigated this fatal
1-70 accident. Webster described conditions encountered by Susanne Orcholski identical
to those encountered by McCorvey almost four days earlier. Webster described how the
inside or fast lane at the 1-70 accident scene was swept free of chips while the outside
lane was covered with gravel. There was no 25 mile an hour speed sign or early warner
in place, and the nearest warning signs were miles from the 1-70 accident scene.
Q.

There is no early warner there, is there?

A.

No.

Q.

There was no 25 mile an hour speed sign there, was
there?

A.

Not that I saw.

Q.

And the inside lane was clean and driveable at any
speed, wasn't it?
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

In fact, our freeways are designed for speeds greater than 55 miles
an hour, aren't they?

A.

They are designed for speeds, yes sir.

Q.

Into the seventies and eighties, isn't that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

But the outside lane, the slow lane had gravel in it. It
was unswept; isn't that correct sir?

A.

Yes. That s correct.

Q.

There were no 'twenty-five mile an hour' signs?

A.

Not that I can recall.

Q.

And the speed was posted at fifty-five miles an hour?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And no early warner?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

The nearest 'loose gravel' sign, the nearest 'right lane
closed' sign were miles back?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the accident occurred when this young woman moved to pass
someone by moving over into the right [unswept] lane and off the
road?

A.

Yes.
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(R. 3004, pp. 96-98).14 (Emphasis added).
If UDOT and its employees were held more accountable for their grossly negligent
conduct, perhaps Daniel McCorvey and Paul Page would be walking today and Susanne
Quinn Orcholski's family would not have buried their daughter. But so long as the
$250,000 statutory damage limitation cap applies to UDOT's operations, that agency has
no incentive to change its methods of operation.

14

UDOT tries to downplay the significance of this fatal accident. UDOT goes so far as
to represent to this Court that: "UDOT has found no evidence that the right lane at

that point, [i.e., 1-70 accident scene] although newly chipped, was unswept."
(UDOT's Responsive Brief, p. 1, fn. 1). (Emphasis added). In view of Daniel Webster's
testimony to the contrary, UDOT was obviously mistaken when it made this
representation. Unfortunately, this was not the only factual mistake in UDOT's Responsive
Brief. UDOT, for example, states that "McCorvey never told them [the jury] that UDOT's
ultimate financial responsibility for its share of the fault was limited by statute." (UDOT's
Responsive Brief, p. 8). (Emphasis added). But UDOT does not tell this Court that McCorvey
asked for an instruction informing the jury of the statutory cap. (Proposed Supplemental Jury
Instruction 35A, R. 2489; Add. U, p. 7). Neither does UDOT inform the Court that it
vigorously opposed the giving of that Instruction on the statutory cap during the jury instruction
settlement conference with the trial court and that as a consequence of UDOT's objection, the
instruction was not given. UDOT's opposition to the giving of an instruction on the statutory
cap is telling. Had such an instruction been given, the effect would have been to encourage the
jury to place more fault upon LeGrand Johnson. Thus, UDOT should have asked for such an

instruction itself. The only possible reason for UDOT to oppose the trial court's
instruction of the jury on the statutory cap was to protect the contractor by
encouraging the jury to assign as much fault as possible to UDOT. By this and
other acts done to protect the contractor, UDOT used the $250,000 recovery limits statute to
deprive Daniel McCorvey of his constitutional rights.
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IX.
ARGUMENT: A $250.000 DAMAGE UMITATIQN CAP ON UDOT'S OPERATIONS IS BOTH
UNNECESSARY AND UNREASONABLE BECAUSE
UTAH TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION REGULATIONS REQUIRE NEGLIGENT
CONTRACTORS TO INDEMNIFY UDOT
Utah Transportation Commission Regulations require contractors to indemnify
UDOT. This indemnification regulation is contained in the Standard Specifications for
Road and Bridge Construction. This Regulations was also a part of LeGrand Johnson's
contract for this chip seal project. (R. 3004, 157-58). The specific regulation requiring
a contractor to indemnify UDOT is contained in Regulation 107.14, which reads in
pertinent part as follows:

The contractor shall indemnify and save harmless the
Department [of Transportation], its officers, and employees
from all suits, actions, or claims of any character brought
about because of any injuries or damage received or sustained
by any person, persons, or property on account of the negligent
operations of said contractor or on account of or in consequence of any
neglect in safeguarding the work or through use of unacceptable materials
in constructing the work or because of any act of omission, neglect or
misconduct of said contractor or because of any claims or amounts
recovered from any infringement of patent, trademark, or copyright, from
any claims or amounts arising or recovered under the "Workmen's
Compensation Act" or any other law, ordinance, order, or decree and so
much of the money due the said contractor under and by virtue of this
contract as shall be considered necessary by the department for such
purpose, may be retained for the use of the department or, in case no
money is due, his surety may be held until such suit or suits, action or
actions, claim or claims or injuries or damages as aforesaid shall have been
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settled and suitable evidence to that effect furnished to the department,
except that money due the contractor will not be withheld when the
contractor produces satisfactory evidence that he is adequately protected by
public liability and property damage insurance.
(Standard Specification for Road and Bridge Construction, Reg. 107.14; Add. I, § 5).15
(Emphasis added). With indemnity provisions such as this, there is no necessity for the
damage limitation cap. With indemnity provisions such as this, it is likewise unreason-

15

At trial, Randy Hunter, an attorney and employee of UDOT's Risk Management
Division, stated in open court that there was at one time such an indemnify provision between
UDOT and LeGrand Johnson:

Mr. Hunter: Yesterday Mr. Klein asked me if there had been, or if
there was an indemnity provision in the contracts.
Mr. Trentadue: What did you say?
Mr. Hunter: I believe I told him there was.
Mr. Trentadue: There was?
The Court: An indemnity provision in the contract.
Mr. Trentadue: Yes, sir.
The Court: Is there one in the contract?
Mr. Trentadue: They [now] deny it, but we believe there is.
(R. 2999, pp. 61-62). (Emphasis added). Following Hunter's admission, the court inquired of
LeGrand Johnson about the existence of such an indemnity agreement and was told that while
UDOT had earlier attempted to assert a right to indemnification under the chip seal contract,
LeGrand Johnson refused to recognize any such contractual duty on its part. ( £ ^ R. 3000, p.
9). But whether or not a contractor voluntarily recognizes the contractual right of indemnification is irrelevant for purposes of McCorvey's challenge to the damage limitation cap as applied
to UDOT. What is relevant, however, is that the contractual right of indemnification can be
created with little effort and at no cost to the public treasury, which makes the damage limitation
cap both unnecessary and unreasonable with respect to UDOT's operations.
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able and arbitrary to single out the seriously injured for denial of their right to be fully
compensated for injuries caused them by UDOT.
X.
ARGUMENT: A $250.000 DAMAGE LIMITATION CAP ON UDOT'S OPERATIONS IS
BOTH UNNECESSARY A N D UNREASONABLE
BECAUSE IT CONTRAVENES THE STRONG
PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING SETTLEMENTS
This Court has long recognized a public policy favoj^. .g settlements of legal
disputes. See UtahDept. ofAdmin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, T8 P.2d 601, 613 (Utah
1983) (puD!'c policy favors the settlement of disputes by compromise so as to avoid delay
as well as public and private expense of litigation); Tracy-Collins Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979) (settlements are favored in law and should
be encouraged because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties but also
to the judicial system).16

With respect to the seriously injured such as Daniel

McCorvey, however, that policy favoring settlements is frustrated by the $250,000
damage limitation cap which protects UDOT. Rather than encouraging UDOT to fairly
evaluate claims by injured persons and to pay those claims with merit, the damage

16

To this end of accomplishing settlements, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been
specifically drafted. £e£, g ^ , Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) (rules of procedure are "constr ed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action"); Ellis v. Gilbe^ 9 Utah 2d
189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967) (Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to allow the j ;es and the
court to determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as
possible).
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limitation cap allows this governmental agency to gamble with the lives and resources of
the most vulnerable people in our society: the seriously injured. There is no better
example of how unnecessary, unreasonable, and unjust this damage limitation cap is than
to see how UDOT abused that statute in Daniel McCorvey's case.
In his Complaint, Daniel McCorvey alleged that UDOT had created a defective,
unsafe and dangerous condition on 1-15 and was otherwise negligent for failing:
(a)

To properly warn of the resurfacing operation;

(b)

To properly set speed limits on 1-15 during such resurfacing;

(c)

To properly warn of the need for reduced speed;

(d)

To properly pave and compact the surface;

(e)

To properly maintain 1-15; and

(f)

To properly design 1-15 at or near the place of the accident.

(R. 002, p. 5). At trial, McCorvey proved each and every one of these allegations of
negligence against UDOT.17 But UDOT did not have to hear the evidence at trial in
17

These claims and the evidence supporting them are in direct contradiction of UDOT's
assertion that the only alleged act of negligence against it involved "the traffic control plan
used on this project/ (UDOT's Responsive Brief, p. 2). (Emphasis added). McCorvey
argued all of the alleged acts of negligence to the jury. (R. 3009, pp. 48, 50, 63. 67-69; R.
3008, pp. 50-53, 57-60. 62). UDOT likewise responded to these arguments. (R. 3009, p. 76;
R. 3008, pp. 66-70). But UDOT's contention on this subject nevertheless raises an interesting
question concerning its wgovernmental-proprietaryM function argument. While the construction
and maintenance of highways may be a governmental function, the preparation of a traffic
control plan for this chip seal project was not. The submission of a traffic control plan is not
such a unique matter that it can only be performed by UDOT. Nor is drafting a traffic control
plan central to a core governmental activity. £©£ generally. Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37.
The contract for this chip seal project specifically provided that the contractor was to supply the
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order to evaluate the merits of McCorvey's claim and to promptly tender the $250,000
cap in settlement.
To evaluate and settle McCorvey's claim, UDOT had to consider the law, as well
as the evidence establishing negligence and damages. This is the same procedure which
a private insurance company undertakes in evaluating claims. But unlike the private
insurance carrier, UDOT can and does ignore both the law as well as the evidence and
intentionally forces the seriously injured to trial with no additional risk to the agency.
Utah's Governmental Immunity Act has a tort claim submission procedure with
which those persons injured by UDOT must comply. McCorvey and others injured by
UDOT's operations are required to submit a claim but there is no corresponding
requirement that UDOT fairly evaluate claims and pay those which in good faith it finds
to be meritorious. In McCorvey's case, a review of the controlling law and evidence
clearly shows that UDOT had no legitimate justification for taking this case to trial
instead of promptly tendering to Daniel McCorvey the $250,000 damage limitation cap.
Instead of dealing in good faith with Daniel McCorvey, UDOT's Risk Management
Division used the recovery limits statute to gamble with Daniel McCorvey's life and to
send a message to other seriously injured victims of UDOT's operations that regardless

traffic control plan. (Plf s Exhibit 8, § 405.09; Add. I, § 6). UDOT could not change this
proprietary function to a governmental function merely by assuming responsibility for providing
the traffic control plan. £ ^ Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 348.
-44-

of how meritorious their claims, UDOT will require them to expend a substantial portion
of the $250,000 compensation cap just to obtain that limited recovery.
To begin with, the law was properly set out in the Jury Instructions which the
court gave to the jury about UDOT's duties surrounding the creation of dangerous
conditions on highways. This instruction, which was not objected to by UDOT, states:

Any person who creates a hazardous condition on a public
highway has a duty to the general public to remove the hazard
or to give an adequate warning unless the hazard is obvious and can
be avoided by highway users. What constitutes an adequate warning
depends upon the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in this
case, such as: the mounting character of the vehicular travel on the
highway; the extent and character of the hazardous condition; the nature of
the warning; and the character of the highway.
(Instruction No. 27, R. 2553). (Emphasis added). UDOT thus fully understood that it
was responsible for any hazardous conditions which it created on 1-15 at the accident site.
Similarly, there could have been no dispute about the evidence of UDOT's
negligence for having created and maintained hazardous conditions on 1-15. Long before
trial, unbiased eyewitnesses to the accident and UDOT's own witnesses, including expert
witnesses, were providing overwhelming evidence of UDOT's negligence. Consider, for
example, the allegation in McCorvey's Complaint that UDOT was negligent for failing

"to properly set speed limits on 1-15 during such resurfacing." (Complaint,
R. 002, p. 5). (Emphasis added).
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UDOT claims that both McCorvey's accident and the accident in which Susanne
Orcholski was killed were caused as a result of these "foolish young driver[s]
willing to risk life and limb" by driving too fast for the "hazardous driving
surface." (UDOT's Responsive Brief, p. 1 fn. 1). (Emphasis added). UDOT even
went so far in its Opening Brief to say that allowing traffic to travel at speeds of 55 miles
per hour in the unswept lanes vas an act of "extreme negligence11 by LeGrand
Johnson:
In light of the high probability of some physical harm resulting from
leaving thick loose gravel in a lane where heavy traffic is moving at 55
miles an hour, this conduct by LeGrand [Johnson] can only be viewed as
extreme negligence evolving a relatively high degree of culpability, just
as the jury found.
(UDOT's Opening Brief, p. 43). (Emphasis added).
In making these assertions, however, UDOT neglected to advise this Court that at
trial UDOT had its project engineer, Richard Griffin, testi

that he set the speeds on this

project and that despite the 25 mile per hour speed limit imposed by the traffic control
plan, he wanted motorists to travel at speeds of 55 miles per hour in the unswept lanes!
Richard Griffin, in fact, testified that no only did he want traffic to drive 55 miles per
hour on the unswept as well as swept lanes at the accident scene, but that motorists
should have been able to drive as fast as 60 miles per hour on that highway:
Q.

Do you think an unswept lane is safe to drive at the high speed of
fifty-five to sixty-five miles an hour?
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A.

Fifty-five miles an hour, I would think they could drive
it, yes.

Q.

And that is even before sweeping?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that's what you were allowing traffic to do on this
project; right?

A.

Yes.
* * *

Q.

What do you consider a safe speed before a lane has been swept?

A.

I think they can go fifty, sixty miles an hour before
sweeping.

Q.

And that would be safe?

A.

I think so.

(R. 3004, pp. 198-200). (Emphasis added). Against the background of Griffin's clear
statement that he wanted motorists to travel at speeds of 55 miles per hour in the unswept
lanes, UDOT only needed to look at the opinions it had received from nonparty
eyewitnesses to the accident, its own employees and expert witnesses to evaluate the
merits of McCorvey's liability case.
Edward Villarreal and C. Dewey Taylor were two nonparty, unbiased witnesses
to the McCorvey accident. UDOT took the depositions of these two men almost three
years before the McCorvey trial. (R. 2994, R. 2996). UDOT, therefore, could hardly
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have been surprised at trial when both witnesses blamed the accident upon absence of
traffic control. Villarreal said: "Nobody was slowing down the traffic. The
accident wouldn't have happened if there had been some supervision. I'll
just put it just plain that way." (R. 3004, p. 40). (Emphasis added).
Taylor gave an identical opinion to Villarreal's:
Q.

I just knew that the road was hazardous and people should have be*
driving slower. But there was nobody out there to make them drive
slower. And as you know, on roads today, you've got to
make people drive slov or they're not going to drive
slow.

(R. 3009, p. 112). (EnA asis added). Villarreal and Taylor's opinions about the lack
of pee control were shared by UDOT's employees and expert witnesses.
LOOT safety inspector, Curtis Berry, for instance, testified that in his opinion high
speeds on chip sealed roads could be unsafe and that he wanted to keep traffic slowed
down on this project so there would be fewer accidents.
Q.

In your opinion, based upon this experience, high speeds on chipped
roads are unsafe, aren't they.

A.

They could be.

Q.

Well, in fact you told me they are unsafe, haven't you?

A.

I think I said they could be.

Q.

In fact, you told me that you want to keep the traffic
slowed throughout the project, didn't you.
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And if you do that, you would have fewer accidents,
wouldn't you?

A.

Yes.

(R. 3005, p. 131). (Emphasis added). Berry also testified that the speed limit throughout
the chip seal project was supposed to have been 25 miles per hour. dcL at 111, 187).
Alt Staples, another employee, had been the UDOT shed foreman at Cove Fort for
32 years. (R. 3007, p. 16). Staples was a witness that UDOT called, and his testimony
was devastating to UDOT. Staples testified that Griffin had told him to sweep the project
because the contractor was falling behind on its sweeping duties; whereas, Griffin
testified that he wanted traffic to travel on the unswept lane. (R. 3007, p. 30; R. 3004,
p. 197). More importantly, Staples could not believe that Griffin had said that he wanted
the public to travel at speeds of 55 miles per hour on the unswept lane. In Staples'
opinion, it was not safe to travel at speeds of 55 miles per hour on the unbroomed
highway:
Q.

Mr. Staples, how fast should traffic drive on an ungroomed lane?
If you have gravel down, no broom has been over it, how fast
should traffic drive?

A,

They have the advisory signs. They are suggesting how fast they
should drive.

Q.

What do you think?

A.

That's what they are for. I think.
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Q.

But what speed sir?

A.

Well, I don't think they should, in any case, go over 35.

Q.

Thirty-five would be a top speed?

A.

Yes.

(R. 3007, pp. 33-34). (Emphasis added).
* * *

Q.

And if he [Dick Griffin] said that it was safe for motorists to drive
55 miles an hour on that unswept lane, and they wanted him to do
that, they wanted the motorists to do that, you would disagree with
him [Griffin], wouldn't you?

A.

I would normally on a fresh chip job, yes.

Q.

It isn't safe.

A,

No. If it's traveling 55 on a unswept road . . .

(LL pp. 35-36). (Emphasis added).
UDOT hired three expert witnesses who also said that motorists should have been
controlled to 25 miles per hour on this project and that it was unsafe to allow motorists
to travel at speeds of 55 miles an hour on the unswept lanes. These witnesses were
Robert A. Galloway, UDOT's chip seal expert, Newell Knight, UDOTs accident
reconstructionist and Arthur C. Geurts, a retired UDOT traffic engineer.
Galloway testified that the traffic on this project should have been controlled to 25
miles per hour through placement of signs and that these signs should have been spaced
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at intervals of 500 to 1000 feet throughout the project. (R. 310, pp. 52, 54-55). When
asked if one 25 miles per hour sign was sufficient to slow motorists' speed on this
project, he answered unequivocally no.18

Q.

And is one [25 MPH] sign sufficient to slow speed for
four miles of traffic, in your experience?

A.

For now much distance?

Q.

Four miles.

A.

One sign?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I wouldn't think so, no.

Q.

And would one sign be sufficient to — one advisory
speed sign of 25 [miles per hour] be sufficient to slow
traffic for 15 miles?

A.

No.

(R. 310, p. 53). (Emphasis added).
Newell Knight was even more critical of UDOT. Knight said that driving 50 to
60 miles per hour was too fast for this road and that such high speeds were unsafe.

18

Galloway was asked about one 25 mile per hour sign because the UDOT officials in
charge of this project, UDOT's defense witnesses, UDOT's expert witnesses and even UDOT's
counsel all admitted or testified that there was only one 25 mile per hour sign on this project and
that this sign was an advisory sign, not a regulatory sign as required by the traffic control plan.
(R. 3005, pp. 182-183; R. 3007, p. 46; R. 3006, pp. 234, 249; Plfs Exhibit 75 and 76; R.
3009, p. 78).
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Q.

I believe you testified, did you not . . . in your deposition that you thought 50 to 60 miles per hour was too
fast for this road?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In fact, you thoi
you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You thought 30 to 40 [miles per hour]?

A.

If that's what I said, that's what I said. I think the speed should

the speed should have been a lot lower, didn't

have been lower than what was being driven on there.
Q.

Because that what was being driven on was unsafe for conditions?

A.

That's unsafe cause you are going to throw rocks and
gravel all over. That's why you put the advisory speed
up of 25.

(R. 3010, pp. 103-104). (Emphasis added).
Arthur C. Geurts was retired, but he had been UDOT's chief traffic engineer.
UDOT retained Geurts as an expert witness, and it was Geurts' opinion that ihe presence
of gravel in the roadway causes drivers to become aggressive and take excessive risks in
order to avoid damaging their vehicles. (R. 3004, pp. 204-206).
On the final issue of damages, UDOT did not contest Daniel McCorvey's physical
injuries. Neither did UDOT contest Daniel McCorvey's economic loss. UDOT did not
even cross examine McCorvey's medical witnesses or his economic [damage] witnesses.
(R. 2998, pp. 18, 25; R. 3. 3000, p. 87; R. 3005, p. 147; R. 3006, p. 29). UDOT, in
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fact, concedes in its Responsive Brief that it does not challenge "the large amount of

special and general damages the jury found." (UDOT Responsive Brief, p. 18).
This then was the information which UDOT's Risk Management Division had to
evaluate McCorvey's tort claim for settlement versus trial purposes. But the law held
UDOT responsible for hazardous conditions which that agency created or allowed to
remain on highways. Unbiased witnesses to the accident as well as UDOT's own
employees and expert witnesses were saying that UDOT had created hazardous conditions
on 1-15 by allowing motorists to drive at 55 miles per hour on the unswept roadway.
There was, in short, no question about UDOT's negligence. There was also apparently
no question in UDOT's mind about the magnitude of McCorvey's injuries, including the
fact that the $250,000.00 damage limitation cap would constitute only 4.6 percent of
McCorvey's total damages and less than 6 percent of McCorvey's economic loss.
In other words, given the applicable law holding UDOT responsible for having
created the hazardous conditions that existed on 1-15 at the time of Daniel McCorvey's
accident, the clear liability on the part of UDOT for having created these hazardous
conditions, and the substantial injury done to Daniel McCorvey, UDOT knew that a jury
would only need to find UDOT's fault at 4.6 percent to equal or exceed the $250,000
statutory cap. Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that UDOT would have
opted to try this lawsuit rather than tender the statutory cap in settlement. But that is
nevertheless exactly what UDOT did.
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Despite repeated efforts by Daniel McCorvey to reach a pretrial settlement, UDOT
refused to make any offer of settlement. UDOT instead retained and paid for all the
defense expert witnesses. (R. 2988, p. 5; R. 2990, p. 6; R. 2992, p. 5). UDOT then
turned these expert witnesses over to LeGrand Johnson's counsel and, at state expense,
several times flew LeGrand Johnson's counsel, the out-of-state expert witnesses from
Main and Texas, as well as other fact and in-state expert witnesses to the accident scene.
(R. 2988, p. 5; R. 3000, pp. 203-205; R. 3005, p. 114). UDOT was prepared to and
did in fact spend many tens of thousands of dollars to protect the fully insured contractor
when there was no chance that a jury might find UDOT's responsibility to be less than
4.6 percent of the total fault. That was an immoral decision by UDOT. It also was an
abritrary, irrational, unfair and unjust decision.
It was immoral because rather than stepping forward and tendering the $250,000
statutory cap in settlement of McCorvey's claims years ago, UDOT exposed Daniel
McCorvey to the needless stresses of a trial, required him to live in poverty while
awaiting his day in court,19 and forced him to expend many tens of thousands of dollars
to obtain a recovery against UDOT. Then, once McCorvey did receive the verdict and

19

To this day, UDOT has never offered to pay McCorvey the $250,000 statutory cap.
UDOT did, however, offer McCorvey $150,000 after the trial court had entered judgment
against UDOT for the $250,000 statutory cap. McCorvey understood UDOT's post judgment
offer to be: accept the $150,000 or spend another $100,000 defending UDOT's frivolous
appeal. McCorvey never accepted that offer and UDOT served its Notice of Appeal on
February 7, 1991. (R. 2970-71).
-54-

judgment which UDOT knew would happen, UDOT objected to the reimbursement of
McCorvey's costs under the guise of sovereign immunity. (R. 2741).
It was arbitrary, irrational, unfair and unjust for UDOT to use the recovery limits
statute in this manner to protect the fully insured contractor, especially when the law
would not for a moment tolerate this type of conduct from a private insurance carrier.
By statute and regulation, private insurance carriers are forbidden to engage in such
unfair practices. The Utah Legislature has enacted an unfair claims practices statute
making it illegal for a private insurance carrier to not attempt "in good faith to

effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of claims in which
liability is reasonably clear." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-303(3)(h). (Emphasis
added). This statute was enacted by the Utah Legislature "to encourage fair and rapid
settlement of claims" and "to protect claimants under insurance policies from unfair
claims adjustment practices." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-101(l)(b) and (c).
The Utah State Insurance Commission has also promulgated regulations to foster

the "prompt and fair settlement of insurance claims." (R. 540-89-2; Add. n,
p. 8). (Emphasis added). These regulations include within the meaning of the term
"claimant" both first party claimants and third party claimants, such as Daniel McCorvey.
(R. 540-89-4C; Add. II, p. 9). These regulations likewise set certain minimum standards
which, if violated, constitute unfair settlement practices. (R. 540-89-3; Add. II, p. 8).
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Among the minimum standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlement practices
applicable to all insurers set by these regulations, is the provision thatH "An insurer

shall promptly pay every valid insurance claim.11 (R. 540-89-11(c); Add. n,
p. 13). (Emphasis added). Furthermore, when a private carrier does act in bad faith by
failing to promptly pay meritorious claims, a common law action for bad faith arises and
the guilty carrier is responsible for judgments in excess of the insured's policy limits.
See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P. 2d 789 (Utah 1991) (recognizing common law
bad faith actions for damages against private insurance carriers). But no such restrictions
govern UDOT's insurance adjusters.
UDOT's insurance adjusters a free to gamble with the lives of the seriously
injured and they can so gamble without risk. The $250,000 recovery limits statute freely
allows UDOT's insurance adjusters (risk managers) to engage in such unfair practices
without any corresponding risk if they are wrong. It is never a level playing field when
a seriously injured person pursues his or her personal injury claim against a wealthy and
powerful defendant, such as a governmental tort feasor. But that playing field becomes
even more sharply inclined against the tort victim when the governmental tort feasor has
the benefit of a recovery limits statute such as in this case. UDOT's use of the $250,000
recovery limits statutes to protect the contractor was a violation of Daniel McCorvey's
right to procedural and substantive due process, his right to a jury trial, the right to an
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effective remedy for the wrongs done to him, and his right to the equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed under Utah Constitution, Article I, §§ 7, 10, 11 and 24. 20

XI.
ARGUMENT: THE DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY DOES NOT REQUIRE TfflS
COURT TO FIND THE ENTIRE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As its final argument, UDOT takes a bizarre position. Apparently recognizing that
the statutory damage limitation cap contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 is
unconstitutional, UDOT asks this Court to declare the entire Utah Governmental
Immunity Act unconstitutional.

In support of this argument, UDOT claims that if

personal injury actions against UDOT are not subject to the statutory damage limitation

20

These constitutional violations, however, cannot be remedied by a new trial. Nor has
Daniel McCorvey asked for a new trial. A new trial would not remedy these violations of
McCorvey's constitutional rights because the contractor, LeGrand Johnson, did not appeal the
jury verdict. Following entry of judgment, counsel for the insurance companies representing
LeGrand Johnson obtained and reviewed the record of proceedings before the trial court.
Recognizing that there was little likelihood of success on appeal and further recognizing that if
a new trial were granted, UDOT might not again accept responsibility for Daniel McCorvey's
injuries, the carriers quickly paid LeGrand Johnson's proportionate share of the judgment,
thereby saving themselves almost $2,000,000 in potential additional damages. LeGrand Johnson
is no longer a party to this action and, therefore, cannot be subject to any additional liability.
The only way for this Court to protect Daniel McCorvey from the violations of his constitutional
rights which UDOT perpetrated at trial, is to remand this case to the District Court for entry of
Judgment in accordance with the Special Verdict.
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cap, then the remainder of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act serves no legitimate
legislative purpose. Such a claim, however, is disingenuous.
In considering UDOT's argument, the Court should note that the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act contains 38 provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-1
through 63-30-38. This law addresses the full scope of governmental immunity and only
a very small portion of the Act deals with damage limitations. This is an important point
for the Court to note because when only a small portion of a statute is declared to be
unconstitutional, the remainder should not be automatically struck down if "the

remaining portions of the Act can stand alone and serve a legitimate
legislative purpose." Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 111 P.2d 406,
414 (Utah 1986).
In this instance, striking down the recovery limits statute on UDOT's operations
will leave intact virtually all of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Striking down the
damage limitation cap on UDOT's operations will not affect the cap on personal injury
actions against other governmental tort feasors. Likewise, striking down the damage
limitation cap as applied to UDOT will not affect the other waivers of immunity
contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act for which there is no damage
limitation — like the waiver of immunity for contractual obligation, and the waiver of
immunity for taking private property without compensation. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 6330-5 and 63-30-10.5. Neither will striking down the statutory damage limitation cap as
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applied to UDOT affect the venue, notice, insurance or claims evaluation procedures
contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Nor will striking down the damage
limitation cap in this limited instance affect the broad portions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act wherein immunity is not waived for assaults, and other activities by
governmental employees.
The legislative purpose behind the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was to waive
sovereign immunity as to some claims but not as to others and to provide a procedure by
which those persons injured by the acts of state employees could have their claims
presented and resolved. By declaring the Utah Legislature's attempt to limit the recovery
for personal injury claims against UDOT unconstitutional, this Court will not destroy or
invalidate the legislative purpose behind the remaining provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
This Court did not strike down the Utah Governmental Immunity Act when it held
the same recovery limits statute unconstitutional as applied to the University of Utah
Hospital. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d 348. Hence, this Court should not be prepared to
jettison the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in this case merely because that statute is
found to be unconstitutional as applied to UDOTs operations. But if the court is inclined
to strike down the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in its entirety, Daniel McCorvey
would ask that the Court go one step further and declare common law sovereign
immunity to be unconstitutional as applied to UDOTs operations. See, s ^ , Standiford,
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605 P.2d at 1237 (the judicial policy is to narrow governmental immunity so that fewer
M

people will be mercilessly and senselessly barred from recovery for their injuries

sustained at the hands of the [governmental] entities designed to serve them); Muskoph
v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961)
(abolishing common law governmental immunity from tort liability).

xn.
CONCLUSION
The recovery limits statute as applied to UDOT's operations is harsh, unfair and
irrational. The restrictions which this statute imposes upon the rights of the severely
injured and the harm this recovery limits statute does to public policy far outweigh any
benefit which this law might otherwise provide to UDOT's operations.

This Court

should, therefore, declare the statutory cap imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34
unconstitutional as applied to UDOT's operations, reverse the trial court's decision
reducing the jury verdict from $2,517,800 to $250,000, set aside the Judgment entered
by the trial court with respect to UDOT and remand this matter to the district court with
instructions to enter Judgment against UDOT in accordance with the jury's Special
Verdict. Daniel McCorvey would also ask this Court for such other and further relief
as to the Court seems just and equitable, including taxation of costs as provided by law.
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DATED this 15th day of September, 1992.

'JXfr.
VID R. OLSEN, Esq.

5SSE C. TRENTADUE, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Appellant McCorvey
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of September, 1992, I caused four (4)
true and correct copies of the above and foregoing to be hand-delivered to the following:
R. Paul Van Tain, Esq.
Attorney General
Annina M Mitchell, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
I hereby certify that the attached is a true and correct excerpt
of the original Transportation Commission Minutes from May 25, 1979,
page 9, and a copy of the Resolution concerning adoption of the Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, and
A true and correct excerpt of the original Transportation Commission
Minutes from June 22, 1979, pages 6 and 7, concerning adoption of the
Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction.
The original documents are on file in the records of the Utah
Transportation Commission/Utah Department of Transportation.

• n eoja' OODOMunity employer

It was moved by Commissioner Cox, seconded by Commissioner Church, and unanimously
passed:
That the following two Administrative Rule Making Items
be approved for final adoption:
(a) Resolution adopting 1978 Edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices
R E S O L U T I O N
WHEREAS, Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 20 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953,
requires the Utah Transportation Commission to adopt a manual for a uniform
system of traffic control devices on highways within Utah, and
WHEREAS, the 1971 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices
for Streets and Highways, published by the U. S. Department of Transportation,
was adopted on the 21st day of January, 1972 and has been in effect until the
present, and
WHEREAS, the 1971 edition has now been replaced by the 1978 edition of the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, published
by the U. S. Department of Transportation, which includes revisions in traffic
control device design and application, and
WHEREAS, it is necessary for the safety of the public and for uniformity
throughout the United States to subscribe to the most current practices in the
area of traffic control devices,
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Transportation Commission adopt
the 1978 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices*for Streets
and Highways, published by the U. S. Department of Transportation. This resolution rescinds and revokes any and all previous manuals adopted as the_s_tandard
for traffic control devices in Utah,
Dated this 25th day of May, 1979.

UTAH TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

ATTEST:

I si
I si
I si
I si
1st

Isl

Ronald A. Fernley, Commission Secretary

R. LaVaun Cox, Chairman
Wayne S. Winters, Commissioner
Charles E. Ward, Commissioner
Samuel J. Taylor, Commissioner
Clem H. Church, Commissioner

(b) Resolution to adopt Part 218 - Railroad Operating Rules
R E S O L U T I O N
WHEREAS, the Utah Transportation Commission has the authority and
responsibility for rail safety, and
WHEREAS, the Utah Transportation Commission has adopted the Federal
Railroad Administration's Rules and Regulations, Parts 200 through 299, of the
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, and

R E S O L U T I O N
WHEREAS, Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 20 of the Utah Code,
Annotated 1953, requires the Utah Transportation Commission to adopt
a manual for a uniform system of traffic control devices on highways
within Utah, and
WHEREAS, the 1971 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways, published by the U.S.
Department of Transportation, was adopted on the 21st day of January
1972 and has been in effect until the present, and
WHEREAS, the 1971 edition has now been replaced by the 1978
edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets
and Highways, published by the U.S. Department of Transportation,
which includes revisions in traffic control device design and application, and
WHEREAS, it is necessary for the safety of the public and
for uniformity throughout the United States to subscribe to the most
current practices in the area of traffic control devices,
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved that the Transportation
Commission adopt the 1978 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways, published by the U.S.
Department of Transportation.

This resolution rescinds and revokes

any and all previous manuals adopted as the standard for traffic control devices in Utah.
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Dated this

A$~at'

S%2-*<^

day of

__, 1979.

UTAB TKANSPORTATIOK COHKISSION

Conmii*/£6ae

ATTESJ*
^Secretary

_/i.

add some requirements for the new airplane that was recently purchased—the Cessna
Single Engine. Mr. Anderson advised that staff recommends the policy.
Commissioner Winters felt the Aeronautical Committee was qualified to make the
recommendations, and he offered a motion, seconded by Commissioner Taylor, and
unanimously passed:
That the Policy entitled "Pilot Qualifications for
State Aircraft11 be approved. Approved copy of the
policy is attached to the official minutes and made
a part thereof.
(b) Promotions - C. V. Anderson advised this was a modification to our policy
to clarify our method

of operation in the area of promotions.

It is our policy to

promote from within the department or within state government prior to going to the
outside.

The policy requires that a Career Board be established to consider pro-

motions of engineers frjom grades 21 to 27 to consist of members assigned by the
Assistant Director in addition to the Personnel Manager.

A board will be established

by the Assistant Diriector to nominate candidates for top management positions above
grade 27. The policy allows for exception to the promotion plan through written
justification stating why filling the position would not be in the best interest of
the department.

Staff recommends approval of this policy.

It was moved by Commissioner Cox, seconded by Commissioner Taylor, and
unanimously passed:
That the Pelifiy entitled "Promotions" be approved.
Approved copy of the policy is attached to the
official minutes and made a part, thereof.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING - FOR FINAL ADOPTION
(a) Resolution - Adoption of Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge
Construction - 1979 Edition - Sheldon McConkie and Ray Hansen noted the rule making
period was complete on this resolution.

There were no requests for hearings in con-

nection with the new Standard Specifications, and it is recommended the resolution
be adopted as final, which will permit us to be governed on our projects by these
new specifications.
-5-

Amotion was made by Commissioner Church, seconded by Commissioner Taylor,
and unanimously passed:
That the Resolution for adoption of the 1979 Edition
f>f .the_ standard Specifications for Road and Bridge
Construction be adopted to read as follows:
R E S O L U T I O N
BE IT RESOLVED THAT, pursuant to the authority granted to the
Utah Transportation Commission, the State of Utah Standard Sj^ecif ications for Road and Bridge Construction, Edition of 1979 is hereby
adopted replacing the Edition of 1970 subject to the provisions of
the "Utah Administrative Rule Making Act." Copy of Specifications
is on file in the department.
Dated this 22nd day of June, 1979.

I si
I si
I si
I si

ATTEST:
1st

UTAH TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

Ronald A. Fernley, Commission Secretary

R. LaVaun Cox, Chairman
Wayne S. Winters, Commissioner
Charles E. Ward, Commissioner
Samuel J. Taylor, Commissioner

Is/ Clem H. Church, Commissioner

REQUEST FROM SANTA FE ENERGY COMPANY TO HANG PIPELINE
Assistant Director Anderson said he had received a request from the Santa Fe
Energy Company to hang a pipe line crossing on Starvation Reservoir Bridge.

In the

past there have been some problems on this; however, they have come back with a
proposal and request to place a 12" casing on the bridge, encasing a 2" line to carry
gas and oil from the east side to the west side of the reservoir. Mr. Anderson said
we are reluctantly requesting the commission for approval, and our District Director
will be requesting they try to bury a line when the reservoir Is drained.

The bridge is

in good condition at the present time. They would like tb proceed with this installation almost immediately.

District Director Jim West, and our Chief Structural En-

gineer R. J. Behling have recommended concurrence in the request.
A motion was made by Commissioner Taylor, seconded by Commissioner Church, and
unanimously passed:
That we grant approval to the request frqmJtjve Santa Fe
Energy Company—to place, a 12" casing on the Starvation Reservoir
Bridge, pending a decision on the part of the District Director
ih.at. other means of getting the gas and oil across the reservoir.. aiLS.not.feasible.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3c5A7

You should know that, if you return a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant State of Utah Department
of Transportation in excess of $250,000.00, the court is required
by law to reduce the judgment against the state to $250,000.00.
Any judgment against defendant LeGrand Johnson Construction Company
is not subject to such a limitation.
Nevertheless, you should not reduce any damages you may
award against the State of Utah. That is for the court to do after
you return your verdict.

You should determine the total amount

of damages that the plaintiff is entitled to, if any.

If any re-

duction in damages is required by law against the State of Utah,
the court will make that reduction based on the total amount of
damages that you find as shown on your Special Verdict.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(1).
Cf. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 593-97 (Utah 1982),

Norman H Bangerter
Governor

Harold C Yance\
Commia-'joner
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R540-89
UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES RULE

R540-89-1

Authority

This rule is promulgated pursuant to Section 31A-201(1) and
31A-2-201(3)(a) in which the Commissioner is empowered to
administer and enforce this title and to make rules to
implement the provisions of this title. Further authority to
provide for timely payment of claims is provided by Section
31A-26-301(l). Matters relating to proof and notice of loss
are promulgated pursuant to sections 31A-26-3Q1 and
31A-21-312(5). Authority to promulgate rules defining unfair
claims settlement practices or acts is provided in Section
31A-26-303(4). Section 31A-2-308(l)(a) provides for penalties
for any person who violates any insurance statute or rule.
R540-89-2

Purpose

The business of insurance continues to be one of public
trust assumed by persons accepting licenses to operate in this
State and inherently includes a duty to treat claimants fairly,
equitably and in good faith. The breach of such duty is
considered to be an unfair or deceptive business practice and
injurious to the insuring public. The purpose of this rule is
to respond to the volume of complaints arising from claims
settlement practices by affirmatively establishing standards of
equity and good faith to guide licensees in the settlement of
claims. Furthermore, as the standards are properly followed by
all licensees, it should encourage future self-regulation of
the insurance industry. It is intended that this rule will
help to establish parity between the public and professional
insurance licensees and facilitate the prompt and fair
settlement of insurance claims.
R540-89-3

Scope

This rule defines certain minimum standards which, if
violated, may constitute unfair claims settlement practices.
All agency actions will be conducted persuant to the Utah
Aministrative Procedures Act. Penalties for violation of this
rule shall be in accordance with Section 31A-2-308, Utah Code.

This rule applies to all persons and to all insurance policies,
contracts and transactions. Individual agents, brokers,
consultants, and adjusters are subject to these standards, as
well as other persons herein defined. This rule is not
exclusive, and other acts, not herein specified, may also be
considered to be violations of the insurance code or other
rules. This rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended
to create a private right of action.
R540-89-4

Definitions

A. "Agent" means any individual, corporation, association,
organization, partnership, or other legal entity authorized to
represent an insurer with respect to a claim, whether or not
licensed within the State of Utah to do so.
B. "Claim" means, for the purpose of this Rule, a request
or a demand on an insurer, whether by a first party or a third
party, for payment of benefits according to the terms of an
insurance policy.
C. "Claimant- means either a first party claimant, a third
party claimant, or both and includes such claimants designated
legal representative and includes a member of the claimant's
immediate family designated by the claimant;
D. "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation,
association, partnership or other legal entity asserting a
right to payment under an insurance policy or insurance
contract arising out of the occurrence of the contingency or
loss covered by such policy or contract. For the purposes of
this Rule, certificate holders of group disability policies are
considered to be first party claimants;
E.

"General business practice" means a pattern of conduct.

F. "Insurance policy" or "insurance contract" Shaix mean
any contract of insurance, indemnity, medical or hospital
service, suretyship, or annuity issued, proposed for issuance,
or intended for issuance by any person;
G. "Insurer" means a person who may issue or who does issue
any insurance policy or insurance contract within this state,
whether or not licensed to do so.
H. "Investigation." means all activities of an insurer
directly or indirectly related to the determination of
liabilities under coverages afforded by an insurance policy or
insurance contract;
I. "Notice of Loss" shall be that notice which is in
accordance with policy provisions and insurer practices.
"Notice of Loss" shall include "Special Notice of Loss" as
defined herein. Notice of loss shall also include a Notice of

Default or Notice of Delinquency to mortgage insurers.
J. ••Notification of claim- means any notification, whether
in writing or other means acceptable under the terms of an
insurance policy or insurance contract, to an insurer or its
agent, by a claimant, which reasonably apprises the insurer of
the facts pertinent to a claim;
K. "Person" shall mean any individual, corporation,
association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, self-insurer,
interinsurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal benefit society, and
any other legal entity engaged in the business of insurance,
including agents, brokers, consultants and adjusters.
L. -Proof of Loss- shall mean, reasonable documentation by
the insured as to the facts of the loss and the amount of the
claim.
M. "Special Notice of Loss" shall mean Notice of Loss
required to be given by means other than first class mail, such
as by telephone or facsimile, or at times which could be other
than during normal business hours.
N. "Specific Disclosure" shall mean notice to the insured
by means of policy provisions in boldface type or a separate
written notice mailed or delivered to the insured.
0. "Third party claimant" means any individual,
corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity
asserting a claim against any individual, corporation,
association, partnership or other legal entity insured under an
insurance policy or insurance contract of an insurer.
R540-89-5

Notice of loss.

A. Notice of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be
considered timely if made according to the terms of the policy,
subject to the definitions and provisions of this rule.
B. Notice of Loss may be given by an insured to any
appointed agent, authorized adjuster, or other authorized
representative of an insurer unless the insurer clearly directs
otherwise by means of Specific Disclosure as defined herein.
C. Subect to policy provisions a requirement of written or
Special Notice of Loss may be waived by any appointed agent,
authorized adjuster, or other authorized representative of the
insurer.
D. If Special Notice of Loss is required, the insured shall
be advised by Specific Disclosure, as defined herein.
E. Insurance policies shall not require Notice of Loss to be
given in a manner which is inconsistent with the actual

-10-

practice of the insurer. An insurer shall not generally
conduct business on the basis of waivers of right, enforcing
the terms of the contract only in exceptional circumstances.
For example, if the general practice of the insurer is to
accept Notice of Loss by telephone, the policy shall reflect
that practice, and not require that the insured furnish
"immediate written notice1* of loss.
R540-89-6

Proof of loss

A. Proof of loss to an insurer, it required, shall be
considered timely if made according to the terms of the policy,
subject to the definitions and provisions of this rule.
B. The requirements of Section 31A-21-312(1)(a) and (b) may
be satisfied in practice and do not require that the actual
language of the above-noted sections be recited in the policy.
R540-89-7
Defined

Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices

The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the
business of insurance, and the commission of which are
violations of this rule:
A. Denying or threatening the denial of the payment of
claims or rescinding, cancelling or threatening the rescision
or cancellation of coverage under a policy for any reason which
is not clearly described in the policy as a reason for such
denial, cancellation or rescission.
B. Failing to provide the insured or beneficiary with a
written explanation of the evidence of any investigation or
file materials giving rise to the denial of a claim based on
misrepresentation or fraud on an insurance application, when
such misrepresentation is the basis for the denial.
C. Compensation by an insurer of its employees, agents or
contractors of any amounts which are based on savings to the
insurer as a result of denying the payment of claims.
D. Failing to deliver a copy of standards for prompt
investigation of claims to the Insurance Department when
requested to do so.
E. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable
investigation.
F. Offering first party claimants substantially less than
the reasonable value of the claim. Such value may be
established by one or more independent sources.
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G. Making claim payments to insureds or beneficiaries not
accompanied by a statement or explanation of benefits setting
forth the coverage under which the payments are being made and
how the payment amount was calculated.
H. Failing to pay claims within 30 days of properly
executed proof of loss when liability is reasonably clear under
one coverage in order to influence settlements under other
portions of the insurance policy coverage or under other
policies of insurance.
I. Refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an
insured's request to do so unless.
1. the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic,
military service, or other immunity from suit or liability with
respect to such claim; or
2. the insured is granted the right under the policy of
insurance to consent to settlement of claims.
J. Advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an
attorney or suggesting the claimant will receive less money if
an attorney is used to pursue or advise on the merits of a
claim.
K. Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of
limitations.
L. Requiring an insured to sign a release that extends
beyond the occurrence or cause of action that gave rise to the
claims payment.
M. Deducting from a loss or claims payment made under one
policy those premiums owed by the insured on another policy
unless the insured consents.
N. Failing to settle a first party claim on the basis that
responsibility for payment of the claim should be assumed by
others, except as may otherwise be provided by policy
provisions.
0. Issuing checks or drafts in partial settlement of a loss
or a claim under a specified coverage when such check or draft
contains language which purports to release the insurer or its
insured from total liability.
P. Refusing to provide a written basis for the denial of a
claim upon demand of the insured.
Q. Denial of a claim for medical treatment after
preauthorization has been given, except in cases where the
insurer obtains and provides to the claimant documentation of
the pre-existence of the condition for which the
preauthorization has been given or if the claimant is not
eligible for coverage.

R. Refusal to pay reasonably incurred expenses to an
insured when such expenses resulted from a delay, as prohibited
by these rules, in claims settlement or claims payment.
S. When an automobile insurei lepresents both a tort feasor
and a claimant:
a. failing to advise a claimant under any coverage that the
same insurance company represents both the tort feasor and the
claimant as soon as such information becomes known to the
insurer;
b. allocating medical payments to the tort feasor's
liability coverage before exhausting a claimant's personal
injury protection coverage.
T. Failure to pay interest at the legal rate, as provided
in Title 15, Utah Code, upon amounts that are overdue under
these rules.
R540-89-8

File and Record Documentation

The insurer's claim files shall be subject to examination by
the Commissioner or by his duly appointed designees. Such
files shall contain all notes and work papers pertaining to the
claim in such detail that pertinent events and the dates of
such events can be reconstructed.
R540-89-9 Misrepresentation of Policy Provisions:
Acts Applicable to All Insurers

Prohibited

A. No insurer shall fail to fully disclose to first party
claimants all pertinent benefits, coverages or other provisions
of an insurance policy or insurance contract under which a
claim is presented, including loss of use and household
services.
B. No agent shall conceal from first party claimants
benefits, coverages or other provisions of any insurance policy
or insurance contract when such benefits, coverages or other
provisions are pertinent to a claim.
C. No insurer shall deny a claim for failure to exhibit the
property without proof of demand and unfounded refusal by a
claimant to do so.
R540-89-10

Failure to Acknowledge Pertinent Communications

A. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of a claim
shall, within 15 days, acknowledge the receipt of such notice
unless payment is made within such period of time, or unless
the insurer has a reason acceptable to the Insurance Department
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as to why such acknowledgment cannot be made within the time
specified.
B. Every insurer, upon receipt of an inquiry from the
Insurance Department
respecting a claim shall, within fifteen days of receipt of
such inquiry, furnish the Department with a substantive
response to the inquiry.
C. A substantive response shall be made within 15 days on
all other pertinent communications from a claimant which
reasonably suggest that a response is expected.
D. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of claim
shall promptly provide necessary claim forms, instructions, and
reasonable assistance so that first party claimants can comply
with the policy conditions and the insurer's reasonable
requirements.
R540-89-11

Standards for Prompt Investigation of Claims

Every insurer shall complete investigation of a claim within
45 days after notification of claim, unless such investigation
cannot reasonably be completed within such time. It shall be
the burden of the insurer to establish, by adequate records,
that the investigation could not be completed within 45 days of
its notification of such claim.
R540-89-12 Minimum Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable
Settlements Applicable to all Insurers
A. The insurer shall provide to the claimant a statement of
the time and manner in which any claim must be made and the
type of proof of loss required by the insurer.
B. Within 30 days after receipt by the insurer of properly
executed notice of loss, the insurer shall complete its
investigation of the claim and the first party claimant shall
be advised of the acceptance or denial of the claim by the
insurer unless the investigation cannot reasonably be completed
within that time. If the investigation cannot be completed
within 30 days the insurer shall so communicate to the claimant
and shall continue to so communicate at least every 30 days
until the claim is either paid or denied. No insurer shall
deny a claim on the grounds of a specific provision, condition,
or exclusion unless reference to such provision, condition or
exclusion is included in the denial. Any basis for the denial
of a claim shall be noted in the insurer§s claim file and must
be communicated promptly and in writing to the claimant.
C. Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer shall
promptly pay every valid insurance claim. A claim shall be
overdue if not paid within 30 days after the insurer is
furnished written notice of the fact of a covered loss and of

the amount of the loss. Payment shall mean actual delivery or
mailing of the amount owed. If such written notice is not
furnished to the insurer as to the entire claim, any partial
amount supported by written notice or investigation is overdue
if not paid within 30 days. Any payment shall not be deemed
overdue when the insurer has reasonable proof to establish that
the insurer is not responsible for the payment, notwithstanding
that written notice has been furnished to the insurer.
D. If negotiations are continuing
with a claimant, notice of expiration
or contract time limit shall be given
60 days before the date on which such

for settlement of a claim
of statute of limitation
to the claimant at least
time limit may expire.

E. No insurer shall make statements which indicate that the
rights of a third party claimant may be impaired if a form or
release is not completed within a given period of time unless
the statement is given for the purpose of notifying the third
party claimant of the provision of a statute of limitations.
F. Proof of loss requirements may not be unreasonable and
should consider all of the circumstances surrounding a given
claim.
R540-89-13 Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable
Settlements Applicable to Automobile Insurance
A. When the insurance policy provides for the adjustments
and settlement of first party automobile total losses on the
basis of actual cash value or replacement with another of like
kind and quality, one of the following methods must apply:
(1) The insurer may elect to offer a replacement automobile
which is a specific comparable automobile available to the
insured, with all applicable taxes, license fees and other fees
incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of the automobile
paid, at no cost other than any deductible provided in the
policy. The offer and any rejection thereof must be documented
in the claim file.
(2) The insurer may elect a cash settlement based upon the
actual cost, less any deductible provided in the policy, to
purchase a comparable automobile including all applicable
taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer of
evidence of ownership of a comparable automobile. Such cost
may be determined by:
(a) The cost of a comparable automobile in the local market
area when a comparable automobile is available in the local
market area; or
(b) One of two or more quotations obtained by the insurer
from two or more qualified dealers located within the local
market area when a comparable automobile is not available in
the local market area.

(3) When a first party automobile total loss is settled on
a basis which deviates from the methods described in
subsections A(l) and A(2) of this section, the deviation must
be supported by documentation giving particulars
of the automobile condition. Any deductions from such cost,
including deductions for salvage, must be measurable, itemized
and specified as to dollar amount and shall be appropriate in
amount. The basis for such settlement shall be fully explained
to the first party claimant.
B. Total loss settlements with a third party claimant shall
be on the basis of the market value or actual cost of a
comparable automobile at the time of loss. Settlement
procedures shall be in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)
of subsection A.
C. Where liability and damages are reasonably clear,
insurers shall not recommend that third party claimants make a
claim under their own policies solely to avoid paying claims
under such insurer's insurance policy or insurance contract.
D. Insurers shall not require a claimant to travel an
unreasonable distance to inspect a replacement automobile, to
obtain a repair estimate or to have the automobile repaired at
a specific repair shop.
E. Insurers shall, upon the claimant's request, include the
first party claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation
demands initiated by the insurer. Subrogation recoveries may
be shared on a proportionate basis with the first party
claimant when an agreement is reached for less than the full
amount of the loss, unless the deductible amount has been
otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be applied first to
reimburse the first party claimant for the amount or share of
the deductible when the full amount or share of the deductible
has been recovered. No deduction for expenses can be made from
the deductible recovery unless an outside attorney is retained
to collect such recovery. The deduction may then be for only a
pro rata share of the allocated loss adjustment expense. If
subrogation is initiated but discontinued, the insured shall be
advised.
F. If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate of the
cost of automobile repairs, such estimate shall be in an amount
for which it may be reasonably expected the damage can be
satisfactorily repaired. If the insurer prepares an estimate,
it shall give a copy of the estimate to the claimant and may
furnish to the claimant the names of one or more conveniently
located repair shops.
G. When the amount claimed is reduced because of betterment
or depreciation, all information for such reduction shall be
contained in the claim file. Such deductions shall be itemized
and specified as to dollar amount and shall be appropriate for
the amount of deductions.
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H. When the insurer elects to repair and designates a
specific repair shop for automobile repairs, the insurer shall
cause the damaged automobile to be restored to its condition
prior to the loss at no additional cost to the claimant other
than as stated in the policy and within a reasonable period of
time.
I. Where coverage exists, loss of use payment shall be made
to a claimant for the reasonably incurred cost of
transportation, or for the reasonably incurred rental cost of a
substitute vehicle, including collision damage waiver, during
the period the automobile is necessarily withdrawn from service
to obtain parts or effect repair, or, in the event the
automobile is a total loss and the claim has been timely made,
during the period from the date of loss until a reasonable
settlement offer has been made by the insurer. The insurer may
not refuse to pay for loss of use for the period that the
insurer is examining the claim or making other determinations
as to the payability of the loss, unless such delay reveals
that the insurer is not liable to pay the claim. Loss of use
payments shall be an amount in addition to the payment for the
value of the automobile.
J. Subject to subsection A and B, an insurer shall fairly
and equitably and in good faith attempt to compensate a
claimant for all losses incurred under collision or
comprehensive coverages. Such compensation shall be based at
least, but not exclusively, upon the following standards:
1. An offer of settlement shall not be made exclusively on
the basis of useful life of the part or vehicle damaged.
2. An estimate of the amount of compensation for the
claimant shall include the actual wear and tear, or lack
thereof, of the damaged part or vehicle.
3. Actual cash value shall take into account the cost of
replacement of the vehicle and/or the part for which
compensation is claimed.
4. An actual estimate of the true useful life remaining in
the part or vehicle shall be taken into account in establishing
the amount of compensation of a claim.
5. Actual cash value shall include taxes and other fees
which shall be incurred by a claimant in replacing the part or
vehicle or in compensating the claimant for the loss incurred.
K. An insurer may not demand reimbursement of Personal
Injury Protection payments from a first-party insured of
payments received by that party from a settlement or judgement
against a third party.
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R540-89-14 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Applicable to
Automobile Insurance
The Following acts or practices are defined as unfair claims
settlement practices pertaining to automobile insurance:
A. Using as a basis for cash settlement with a claimant an
amount which is less than the amount which the insurer would be
charged if repairs were made, unless such amount is agreed to
by the claimant or provided for by the insurance policy.
B. Refusing to settle a claim based solely upon the
issuance or failure to issue a traffic citation by a police
agency.
C. If an application for benefits is required by the
insurer, failing to provide a section for each coverage under
the policy under which the claimant can make a claim.
D. Failing to, in good faith, disclose all coverages,
including loss of use, household services, and any other
coverages available to the claimant.
E. Requiring a claimant to use only the insurer's claim
service in order to perfect a claim.
F. If the insurer makes a deduction for the salvage value
of a total loss retained by the claimant, failing to furnish
the claimant with the name and address of the salvage dealer
who will purchase the salvage for the amount deducted if so
requested by the claimant.
G. Refusing to disclose policy limits when requested to do
so by a claimant or claimant's attorney.
H. Using a release on the back of a check or draft which
requires a claimant to release the company from obligation on
further claims in order to process a current claim when the
company knows or reasonably should know that there will be
future liability on the part of the insurer.
I. Refusing to use a separate release of claims document
rather than one on the back of a check or draft when requested
to do so by a claimant.
J. Intentionally offering less money to a first party
claimant than the claim is reasonably worth, a practice
referred to as "low-balling."
K. Refusing to offer to pay claims based upon the Doctrine
of Comparative Negligence without a reasonable basis for doing
so.
L. In a bailment situation, imputing the negligence of a
permissive user of a vehicle to the owner of the vehicle.

-18-

R540-89-15

Penalties

Subject to the provisions of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act, violators of this rule shall be subject to
fine, suspension, or revocation of their insurance license or
Certificate of Authority, and/or any other penalties or
measures as are determined by the commissioner in accordance
with law. Any penalty imposed under this rule shall be
commensurate with the violation committed and subject to the
following provisions and limitations:
A. Separate and disparate penalties may be assessed
insurer, organization and individual persons;
B. Frequency of occurrence and severity of detriment to the
public shall be considered in determining a penalty;
C. No license or Certificate of Authority shall be
suspended on the basis of a single violation; and
D. No revocation of license or Certificate of Authority
shall occur except upon a finding of improper conduct as a
general business practice.
R540-89-16

Severability

If any provision or clause of this rule or the application
thereof to any person or situation is held invalid, such
invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application
of this rule which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this rule are declared to be severable.
R540-89-17 Effective Date
This rule shall take effect on September 14, 1989.
KEY:
1989

insurance law
31A-2-201
31A-26-301
31A-26-303
31A-21-312
31A-2-308
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